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The human visual system is remarkable for the variety of functions it can be used 
for and the range of conditions under which it can perform, from the detection of small 
brightness changes to guiding actions in complex movements.  The human eye is 
foveated and humans continually make eye and body movements to acquire new visual 
information. The mechanisms that control this acquisition and the associated sequencing 
of eye movements in natural circumstances are not well understood.  
While the visual system has highly parallel inputs, the fovea must be moved in a 
serial fashion.  A decision process continually occurs where peripheral information is 
evaluated and a subsequent fixation target is selected.  Prior explanations for fixation 
selection have largely focused on computer vision algorithms that find image areas with 
high salience, ones that incorporate reduction of uncertainty or entropy of visual features, 
as well as heuristic models.   
However, these methods are not well suited to model natural circumstances where 
humans are mobile and eye movements are closely coordinated for gathering ongoing 
task information. Following a computational model of gaze scheduling proposed by 
Sprague and Ballard (2004), I argue that a systematic explanation of human gaze 
behavior in complex natural tasks needs to represent task goals, a reward structure for 
these goals and a representation of uncertainty concerning progress towards those goals. 
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If these variables are represented it is possible to formulate a decision computation for 
choosing fixation targets based on an expected value from uncertainty weighted reward.  
I present two studies of human gaze behavior in a simulated driving task that 
provide evidence of the human visual system’s sensitivity to uncertainty and reward. In 
these experiments observers tended to more closely monitor an information source if it 
had a high level of uncertainty but only for information also associated with high reward. 
Given this behavioral finding, I then present a set of simple candidate models in an 
attempt to explain how humans schedule the acquisition of information over time.  These 
simple models are shown to be inadequate in describing the process of coordinated 
information acquisition in driving. I present an extended version of the gaze scheduling 
model adapted to our particular driving task. This formulation allows ordinal predictions 
on how humans use reward and uncertainty in the control of eye movements and is 
generally consistent with observed human behavior.   
I conclude by reviewing main results and discussing the merits and benefits of the 
computational models used, possible future behavioral experiments that would serve to 
more directly test the gaze scheduling model, as well as revisions to future 
implementations of the model to more appropriately capture human gaze behavior.
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1. The study of biological vision 
Take a moment to consider a common behavior like walking to a friend’s house.  
Even a simple task like this this requires a complex coordination of the senses and motor 
system.  If we only consider the coordination between vision and walking, this is still 
quite complex.  The human retina is foveated, meaning that high detail information is 
concentrated in a small portion of central vision.   This limit on vision means that if high-
resolution information is required, the center of the eye must be directed towards a target 
in the world.  To gather information during a complex behavior, the eye must be moved 
frequently to peripheral targets as well as scan for new or remembered objects completely 
outside the field of view.  
Using our example of navigating to a house, one can think of a variety of 
behaviors necessary to succeed, including obstacle detection and avoidance to make sure 
you don’t trip, landmark finding for navigation, object localization and recognition to 
look for and read street signs and to ultimately recognize your friend when you arrive.  
This example illustrates a small portion of how versatile the visual system can be in a 
routine activity.  It also raises the question of how does the coordination of such behavior 
arise? In this example of walking, what would control where you looked?  There are 
multiple plausible and non-exclusive explanations.   For instance, an eye movement could 
be caused by many events in the world, the movement of a car, a person walking by who 
resembles your friend, a large obstacle, or past learning to conduct deliberate searches for 
cars, signs, etc.   
Prior research into the control of eye movements has focused primarily on objects 
in the world that capture the eye and on strategies for finding known targets.  While these 
are important research questions, it is known that in natural circumstances, eye 
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movements are often highly coordinated between goals for an ongoing task and less 
directed towards intrinsic task-independent image features (Land, 2004; Hayhoe & 
Ballard, 2005). Studies of human vision implicitly and explicitly engage a host of 
complex mechanisms to deal with seeing and acting in a dynamic world.  One might even 
posit that a comprehensive knowledge of what it means ‘to see’ may require a 
comprehensive embodied knowledge, i.e. seeing is a product of the fact that evolution has 
produced organisms with a variety of behavioral goals that are achieved or attempted by 
the coordination of sensory and motor systems. This notion is sometimes called active 
vision and implies that research of the human visual system should take into account 
behavioral goals and that these goals can dramatically shape how visual information is 
acquired and processed. 
If we consider everyday behaviors such as playing a sport, driving a car, or 
making a meal, a very simple question to ask is how do humans accomplish such visuo-
motor activities?  A pragmatic, explanation might be along the lines of “I have some 
objective, I look around for and acquire the tools necessary to complete that objective and 
perform a task or set of tasks with those tools to accomplish the goal.”   While such an 
abstract answer may seem trivial, on an abstract level it encapsulates many aspects of 
research in vision and robotics such as sensory systems, task planning, learning, search, 
navigation and motor control.   If we want to understand how humans perform such 
complex behaviors, what would we need to know?  Given the level of difficulty to 
answer this completely, for this dissertation we must restrict the question to something 
more tractable:  In the context of visuo-motor coordination, where do humans look while 
performing natural tasks and is there a systematic way in which to describe this behavior?   
Simplistically, vision science has historically focused on in vivo and ex vivo 
understanding of how low-level vision works.  Such studies are essential and have taught 
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a great deal about the sensory and cognitive limits of vision, but another approach to add 
to our understanding is to consider the visuo-motor system in situ.  In natural settings, the 
visual and motor systems coordinate together to achieve a hierarchy of goals and many 
issues that are often the focus of standard psychophysics (e.g. the detection of a stimulus 
at threshold) are no longer as prominent and new avenues for experimentation open.  
Continuing with the example of walking to a friend’s house, the final goal may be to talk 
to your friend. However, there are multiple sub-tasks that must be executed to bring about 
that high-level goal, such as finding a street sign and making sure no cars are present 
when crossing the street.  In coordinating these goals, it seems plausible that a system 
would be required to keep track of what behaviors can occur, which behavior is currently 
most important and any world events related to these goals.  
This arbitration process between goals is sometimes referred to as the scheduling 
problem (Sprague & Ballard 2003, Salgian & Ballard 1998, Hayhoe 2000).  In this 
dissertation, I address how humans approach the problem of scheduling the acquisition of 
task-relevant visual information with a set of eye tracking experiments of human 
participants and also discuss the development and testing of a set of computational 
models that attempt to mimic humans’ observed eye movement patterns. 
 
DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
 
As an overview to subsequent chapters, I will discuss a variety of prior research 
that provides a context for the scheduling problem in vision.  I’ll first review research 
regarding the sensory and goal driven control of eye movements (Chapter 2). I’ll then 
discuss research that has focused on reward and uncertainty and how these variables may 
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be critical in understanding vision in natural circumstances (Chapter 3). In my 
experiments, a driving simulator is used to research how human observers might use 
uncertainty and reward while driving. To provide context for these experiments, I cover 
prior research on eye movements in driving (Chapter 4).  I then discuss several proposed 
models of eye guidance (Chapter 5). In particular, the computational scheduling model of 
Sprague and Ballard will be a primary focus. Finally, I present the two experiments I 
performed (Chapters 6 & 7) and a description of my attempts to model human gaze 
behavior observed in driving (Chapters 8). 
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2. Psychophysics and vision in natural tasks 
 
Since the human retina is foveated, this leads to a higher level of spatial 
uncertainty about peripheral retinal information than central. Due to this and other 
uncertainty sources, we must move our eyes and often the head or whole body to bring a 
visual stimulus into central vision.  Eye movements are thought of as a sub-branch of 
visual attention.  Visual attention is typically broken down into overt attention with an 
orienting response, i.e. an eye movement, and covert attention where there is no outward 
physical orienting response but visual information in the periphery is processed 
selectively. 
A good deal of visual attention research is concerned with covert search (see Wolf 
& Horowitz 2004). However, in real world situations human observers must continually 
monitor peripheral information (covert search) and use this information to make an eye 
movement to redirect the fovea (overt search).  A major question that vision scientists 
have asked is how are the targets of eye movements selected?   Eye movements occur 
frequently and while the eye movement system can be used under voluntary control, the 
sheer number of eye movements (often estimated around three per second) and the 
frequent lack of awareness in making them, suggests that eye movements are typically 
guided by largely unconscious internal principles related to the image-based properties 
and the active acquisition of information without the need for deliberate volitional 
calculation of each movement.    
In general, the terminology used to describe the selection and generation of eye 
movement falls along the lines of: ‘top-down vs. bottom-up’, ‘endogenous vs. 
exogenous’, or ‘task-driven vs. stimulus-driven’.  This distinction, as many binary pole 
concepts are apt, neglects a continuum of behavior and partly muddies the frameworks to 
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which researchers attach their theories, since vision must undoubtedly use both (an 
unexpected large looming stimulus, e.g. someone’s hand in your face, will quickly 
convince you of bottom-up vision and the mere fact that you can coherently read this 
sentence implies some level of top-down control).  Many have acknowledged this 
interaction (Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, and Hyle, 2003; Hayhoe and Ballard, 2005; Itti and 
Baldi, 2006; Knudsen, 2007) and while it is easy to devalue these concepts when taken to 
their logical extreme, they do have utility in that they set the limits for what we might 
expect if eye movements were generated by a pure form of either.  In particular, I will 
later discuss a task-based theory of gaze control, which will allow us to ask the question 
‘If vision were only controlled by top-down goals what could such a system accomplish 
and how does it compare with the behavior of human observers?’  First though, we 
should review the different theories and pieces of evidence for how humans make eye 
movements. 
 
VISUAL ATTENTION AND STIMULUS DRIVEN CONTROL 
 
One line of study in the control of human eye movements has been to consider to 
what degree they are based on inherent properties of image features.  This research 
addresses the idea that certain ‘salient’ visual features (Triesman & Galade, 1980) can 
attract overt or covert attention via high contrast in a particular feature dimension (e.g. a 
red bar on a solid green background, or sudden motion or appearance of objects).  Such 
approaches have largely been concerned with estimating how much control on attention 
salience exerts as well as computational models of how salient image features could be 
computed.      
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One topic in visual attention studies is visual search, how human observers find 
visual targets.  In such studies many elements of the top-down and bottom-up conceptual 
frameworks are present. A typical search experiment might involve an observer with their 
head fixed looking at a display on a monitor trying to find a target amongst distracters. In 
these experiments, reaction times and/or eye movement strategies (if eye movements are 
allowed) are examined for evidence that certain visual features help or hinder search. 
While preparing observer with a known search target is subject to top-down control, 
many image properties can affect performance. It is accepted that set-size (the number of 
distinct objects in the search array) and discriminability of the target from distracters 
(signal-to-noise) are key factors that influence search times (Wolfe & Horowitz 2004).  A 
sufficiently discriminable target (i.e. a large bottom-up visual contrast signal, such as a 
red target amongst green distracters), sometimes called a pop-out or singleton target, will 
have a roughly constant search time regardless of set size, suggesting parallel search.  
Conjunction searches, where multiple visual features define a target, are more difficult 
and reaction times scale with set-size, suggesting serial search.  These results suggest that 
within these contexts, control of attention is largely stimulus based but this guidance is 
altered by many factors. 
Studies examining attentional capture (the automatic reorienting of the eye or 
attention towards a stimulus) use the paradigm of visual search but also introduce 
unexpected or pop-out visual features during the search process or between trials of 
search (Yantis and Egeth 1999; Folk and Remington, 1998; Forster and LaVie, 2008, 
Theeuwes 2004; Leber and Egeth 2006).  The core intent of these studies is to ascertain if 
there is an obligatory focus of attention on task-irrelevant features, usually measured via 
increases in reaction time, and if not, what top-down processes may be in operation to 
stop such effects.  Currently, there is much discussion in the field regarding how 
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automatic such orienting is and how extensively it is controlled by top-down goals 
(Forster and LaVie, 2008).  
The idea of contingent attentional capture states that unless a distracter shares 
features with the search target, top-down control can effectively silence interference by a 
singleton and capture will not occur (Folk and Remington, 1998). Dependent on the goals 
of the observer, distracter’s features can then be filtered and ignored. Lu and Han (2009) 
nicely demonstrated this interaction between bottom-up and top-down influences.  They 
had participants perform a search task where the saliency of a distracter and task 
difficulty were manipulated independently. They found that attentional capture increased 
with increases in salience and decreases in task difficulty, such that a low salience 
distracter can be effectively ignored during high task demands but can slow reaction 
times in low difficulty scenarios. Currently, there is much debate within the literature 
about whether attentional capture is truly obligatory, emphasizing the interplay between 
bottom-up and top-down attentional mechanisms (Knudsen 2007, Folk and Remington 
1994, Fecteau, 2007).  
Ultimately, any purely stimulus driven description of visual attention cannot 
explain behavior in complex and dynamic visual scenes. A central problem with using 
bottom-up inputs to guide attention is the inflexibility of such a mechanism.  In natural 
conditions, salient features may not be always be useful (e.g. specular reflections while 
driving), relevant objects may not be salient (e.g. a street sign in a shadow). While one 
can imagine and find examples in nature of bottom-up attentional control systems that 
direct attention in a useful way in some contexts (e.g. helping find food from rapid 
biological motion, similar to predatory orienting behavior in frogs and cats).  However, 
this stimulus-response style scenario seems rather limited in robustness given the 
variability of image features in the world, and a more flexible attentional architecture 
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seems necessary for more sophisticated visual behavior.  Furthermore the utility of 
bottom-up models for explaining human visual behavior are inherently limited since they 
were not formulated to consider eye movements beyond passive viewing and search 
contexts where attentional capture via saliency might occur.  In Chapter 5, I’ll revisit the 
topic of bottom-up attentional control when discussing salience models of vision, for now 
it suffices to say that bottom-up control has limited explanatory power for human visual 
behavior. In natural vision, humans are embedded in a perception and action cycle where 
they select and act on information in the world and must deal with the dynamics they 
induce on the world as well those already present in it.  It may be the case that vision has 
evolved in such a way that many stimuli that can capture attention or generate eye 
movements are relevant to survival.  However, in complex scenes and in the context of 
having flexible task goals, there may be many irrelevant visually salient stimuli and there 
must be some arbitration mechanism to evaluate what stimuli need to be attended to at 
the current moment. This alternative orienting mechanism falls under the general title of 
task-driven control. 
 
TASK DRIVEN CONTROL 
There are a number of examples of how eye movements in natural circumstances 
are goal directed, where a solely stimulus-driven attentional system is not very useful.  
For instance, Land et al (1999) and Hayhoe (2001) have examined eye movements of 
participants making tea and a sandwich respectively.  In both circumstances subjects’ eye 
movements are tightly coupled to their motor behavior and task needs.  A subject may 
foveate a knife tip to guide it while spreading, or while pouring tea a subject may check 
between the teakettle spout and the amount of liquid present in a cup to estimate when to 
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stop.  Similarly, in a famous early vision experiment by Yarbus (1967) and later 
replicated by DeAngelus & Pelz (2004), eye movements were recorded while subjects 
were instructed to look at one photograph under a variety of experimental instructions. 
These experiments demonstrated that even in the (seemingly) simple task of viewing a 
single picture there appear to be task-dependencies, e.g. eye movement patterns for 
detecting the ages of people present in the photo differ from the patterns used to estimate 
material wealth.  These findings highlight the fact that eye movements are highly 
associated with the ongoing task and most tasks require unique visual information 
relevant to that task. 
Hayhoe et al (1998) further demonstrated this principle in an experiment where 
participants were eye tracked while observing a computer monitor and using a computer 
mouse to manipulate onscreen blocks with the objective of copying a reference model of 
blocks arranged in a particular way with another set of blocks in an onscreen workspace.  
They found that fixations are well timed with hand movements in this block copying task 
and found evidence that subjects tend to store very sparse information in memory for 
each fixation (e.g. one fixation for the color of block, another fixation for its position).  A 
follow-up study by Pelz et al (2001) demonstrated that this behavior is contingent on 
environmental affordances and that if subjects must make head movements in addition to 
eye movements, they will tradeoff a higher memory load so that only one fixation and 
eye movement is necessary instead of the two mentioned above.  Another demonstration 
of how task goals can shape eye movement strategies for acquiring visual information is 
from Droll et al (2005).  In their experiment, subjects were immersed in a 3D virtual 
environment and sorted blocks according to color, texture or shape.  Subjects were cued 
to pickup a block from a set of other blocks and place it in a location contingent on the 
same or different image feature cue.  Subjects’ eye movements were well timed with 
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different aspects of picking up (looking at the array of blocks), movement and placement 
(looking at cue, the block, destination), and placement of the block while sorting.  
Additionally, the blocks occasionally changed visually as subjects sorted them, if they 
noticed this they were told to put the block aside.  Droll et al found that subjects are less 
sensitive to changes that are task irrelevant (i.e. uncued visual features) as well as other 
more subtle changes in memory use, depending on how features are cued.   The above 
experiments indicate that humans use their eyes in a dynamic fashion, sometimes only 
small pieces of visual information are acquired and the interplay between memory and 
eye movements is contingent on task and environmental constraints. 
Droll et al also showed adaptability in how frequently subjects check objects after 
a change is detected.  They found that subjects increased vigilance several trials after 
detecting a change, indicating a potential top-down strategy to maintain awareness before 
a visual change occurs again.  Jovancevic et al (2006) found similar results in an 
experiment tracking participants’ eyes while walking a virtual sidewalk amongst 
pedestrians.  If a pedestrian walked on a collision path (but did not actually collide) with 
the subject, fixations on subsequent pedestrians were increased, suggesting raised 
vigilance for collision detection.  Additionally, the researchers looked at a variety of 
bottom-up signals (e.g. color, speed, and size) and found no correlation with detection of 
the colliding pedestrians. A follow-up study by Jovancevic and Hayhoe (2009) more 
closely examined this behavior and the role of learning.  They again had subjects walk 
with pedestrians who sometimes walked on a collision path. However, in this experiment 
the probabilities of collision were manipulated so that subjects walked in consecutive 
conditions, either walking with pedestrians with a high probability of a collision path or 
with pedestrians with low collision probability.  Subjects tend to approximately 
probability match pedestrians according to their chance of going on a collision course, 
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which alone might suggest a salience driven mechanism.  However, subjects exhibited 
hysteresis such that prior experience with low probability pedestrians influenced gaze 
patterns with high probability pedestrians (less vigilance) and vice versa (overly vigilant).  
These results again indicate that eye movements are linked to the task at hand and that 
they are dynamically allocated depending on the context and incorporate aspects of 
learning.   
Given this brief overview of stimulus- and task-driven control in human vision, 
let’s summarize.  First, stimulus-driven control is well studied and has been very useful in 
helping provide a framework for computational modeling of human vision (discussed in 
more depth in Chapter 5).  However, pure stimulus-based guidance of eye movements is 
controversial even in very simple experimental setups and its role becomes less 
pronounced in goal-driven vision scenarios.  In particular, if we’d like to address 
situations where human observers have a set of sources of visual information that they 
need to regularly foveate, we need to start thinking of what types of computations might 
be required to choose the timing and location of eye movements and what stimulus and 
task variables would be useful to represent. In the next chapter I’ll discuss why 
perceptual uncertainty and a task-relevant reward structure would be helpful additions in 
forming a model of eye movement selection.  With this background material in place we 
will then address how these elements are incorporated in a gaze scheduling model. Later 
(Chapter 4), I will discuss prior research on human gaze behavior in driving to setup the 
rationale for my own driving experiments and eventually tie together the threads of 
representing goals, rewards and uncertainty in a model of gaze behavior in driving. 
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3. Reward and Uncertainty in Human Behavior 
If human gaze behavior is often dominated by top-down influences how does this 
arise and what influences the gaze strategies adopted?  Obviously, we know that human 
observers have the ability to engage in goal directed behavior and have desires that drive 
that behavior, but it is not clear what is the best way to represent these in a systematic 
way.  In some ways this representation problem has been quite limiting for models of top-
down controlled vision.  It is in some ways more straightforward to implement a 
computer vision algorithm that has basic similarity with neural processing in primary 
visual cortex. These models result in ‘saliency’ type models that can label pixels as being 
good candidates for fixation, independent of a task.  However, current evidence suggests 
that while the visual system may start with a set of image feature filters similar to a 
salience model, these filters and their outputs can be tuned for very particular task 
demands (Gilbert & Sigman 2007).  In this light, top-down models of vision are more 
focused on ‘a theory of tasks’ and how sensory information can be used to guide motor 
output towards some set of desired states in the world. Theoretically there are several 
ways one might approach this, in particular Sprague & Ballard (2004) and others have 
suggested that eye movements may be driven by two key parameters: reward and 
uncertainty.    
 
NEURAL REPRESENTATION OF REWARD 
First let’s consider the effects of reward on eye movements.  If an observer has a 
set of goals, their achievement needs to be monitored via some sort of feedback. Reward-
based or reinforcement learning (which I will address in more detail below) can allow a 
naive organism or agent to learn appropriate motor responses to achieve a goal, e.g. 
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getting a pellet of food via pressing a lever.   There is considerable neural evidence that a 
variety of cortical and subcortical areas involved in the generation of saccadic eye 
movements have activity that is correlated with reward and reward prediction. Neural 
firing in saccade-related areas in the cortex (LIP, FEF, SEF and DLPF) has been shown 
to correlate with reward, although there is still much debate on the exact computation 
being carried out and what mathematical constructs best explain such activity (Platt & 
Glimcher, 1999; Glimcher, 2003; Dorris & Glimcher, 2004; Deaner et al, 2005; Sugrue et 
al, 2004; Stuphorn et al, 2000; Stuphorn & Schall, 2006; Seo et al, 2007). These areas 
converge on the caudate nucleus in the basal ganglia. Basal ganglia areas including the 
caudate, putamen, and substantia nigra have all been implicated in the computation of 
reward related activity and study of the dopaminergic circuits underlying their function 
has provided several proposed mechanisms for how such activity may be generated. This 
cortical- basal ganglia- superior colliculus circuit appears to regulate the control of 
fixations and the timing of planned movements (Hikosaka et al, 2000; Watanabe et al, 
2003; Hikosaka et al 2006). In a similar human study, Stritzke, Trommerhauser, and 
Gegenfurtner (2009) found that human observers’ eye movements were sensitive to 
reward structure determined by measuring close their eye was to a saccadic target. 
However, subjects did not appear to saccade in a way that optimally maximized reward, 
unlike similar experiments with hand movements, which are much closer to optimal. In 
this case “reward” was defined by awarding points for eye movements, which may be 
ecologically invalid. 
Given the complexity of human saccadic behavior, the types of neural activity 
above could be well suited to the learning and control of overt visual attention. However, 
these studies have largely looked at learning with a primary reinforcer, e.g. a monkey 
gets a sip of juice immediately after making a correct saccadic movement.  While there 
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are situations where visual stimuli might be directly rewarding (e.g. social situations), it 
is unlikely that representing primary reinforcers is the sole use of the circuitry described 
above.  Instead, during natural activity, animals must conduct a series of sensory 
orientations and navigation actions to gain a reward, e.g. scavenging for food. In human 
behavior, gaze changes accrue information, which presumably confers secondary reward. 
The Sprague and Ballard model does not attempt to explain reward based neural activity 
in saccadic circuits and instead models reward based learning as a relationship between 
the world state and navigation actions and not the direct reward of the eye movements 
responsible for that information.  While the neural link between reward for eye 
movements that assist navigation or other tasks is unknown, this model offers a possible 
conceptualization of how this mapping might be created. While it is unknown exactly 
how neural systems learn these contingencies, there has been considerable work in 
psychology and computer science to algorithmically represent possible mathematical 
frameworks for such learning, below I present a brief primer on the reinforcement 
learning (RL) framework, focusing on the Q-learning (Watkins 1992) variant of the 
algorithm. Given this primer, I then discuss a particular version of Q-learning, GM-
SARSA, which is a core component of the Sprague and Ballard algorithm. 
 
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
The goal of reinforcement learning (from a purely functional point of view) is to 
learn a look-up table that will ultimately map a state of the world s to an action a, this 
state to action mapping is called a policy, π(s).  One way to learn this mapping is to let an 
agent execute many actions across states of the world until the rewards and punishments 
learned from the world sculpt a landscape that allows only the best actions (ones that 
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maximize reward) to be chosen.    A learning agent (LA) maintains a vector st of discrete 
variables describing the state of the world over a series of discrete time steps t = 1 … T. 
At each time step, the LA chooses a discrete action at t that will maximize the available 
reward. Positive or negative reinforcement rt is given to the LA whenever st is a state that 
achieves some goal or sub-goal, specified by the modeler as part of the construction of 
the world. The LA receives supervision only in the form of these explicit reward values, 
which are often nonzero only for a small fraction of world states. 
During training, the LA constructs an exhaustive Q-table, Q(st, at), of the expected 
rewards that are attainable by taking each action from each state in the world. If the LA 
takes an action when the world is in state st, it observes the resulting state st+1 and its 
associated reward rt+1 on the following time step. Using a learning rule, the LA can then 
update Q(st, at) so that over time this Q-value becomes closer to the “expected future 
reward” for (st, at). The LA adjusts the Q-values by following the gradient of the error in 
Q:  
 
Where α is a learning rate parameter between 0 to 1 and ΔQ is the direction of the 
greatest observed change in Q at (st, at).  The converged Q values reflect both the 
immediate reward in a state, and all future rewards attainable from that state, discounted 
exponentially by the number of time steps required to reach those future states. Thus ΔQ 
takes the form: 
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where rt+1 is the reward available in state st+1 (which follows state st after taking action 
at) and γ is a parameter called the discount factor. Values of γ near 0 cause the LA to rely 
more on immediate rewards for the Q-values, while values near 1 blur the distinction 
between immediate and future reward, allowing the agent to postpone immediate rewards 
for potentially larger future rewards. Although the update for Q-tables is each step, the 
gamma value effectively exponentially weights Q-value estimates across trials in a 
decreasing fashion over time.  A high γ will heavily weight prior experience to deal with 
large dimensionality of the state space and state transitions. 
A simple yet powerful learning rule for  is simply the Q-value associated 
with the subsequent action selected by the agent:  
 
This rule, called SARSA (state-action-reward-state-action) learning, ensures that, 
along any given sequence of state/action pairs that are chosen by the agent, the expected 
rewards obey the discounting enforced by the gamma parameter. The Q-values can be 
used to select an action, often the max can work well, or using a softmax rule, where the 
probability of choosing action at when the world is in state st is given by 
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GM-SARSA 
Traditional RL operates within a single, joint state space that must be capable of 
representing all task-relevant aspects of the world simultaneously. Because the LA must 
visit each state/action pair multiple times (in theory an infinite amount) during learning to 
formulate an accurate estimate of the Q-values, a large state space leads to slower 
convergence during learning. In complex environments, RL is more efficient if a learner 
is allowed to focus on a small portion of state variables relevant to a particular task. 
Instead of running the driving simulation in a joint state space that represents all possible 
variables of interest simultaneously, one can use a technique called GM-SARSA (GM for 
greatest mass) to split the world into small task modules (Sprague & Ballard 2003).  Later 
we will see how these modules can be assigned to specific visual computations that are 
intended to be analogous to the overt fixation strategies made by human drivers (e.g. 
estimating distance of a car that you’d like to follow). 
In GM-SARSA, each task module i = 1 … N has a separate state space and Q-
table, Qi(sit, at), but the tasks share an overlapping action space. When the LA needs to 
select an action at, it uses the state estimates s1t, …, sNt for each task to retrieve the 
corresponding vectors of Q-values: Qi(s1t, ), …, QN(sNt, ). These vectors are summed, 
and the result, 
 
is used in the decision rule to select the best action. The GM-SARSA learning rule 
maintains the correctness of task learning with multiple modules. Because the action 
space is shared among all modules, the Q-tables can be updated correctly even though the 
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selected action might not have corresponded to the highest-reward action for any of the 
individual task modules. 
 To summarize so far, reward has been shown to shape human visual strategies as 
well as the neural activity in visual processing and eye movement areas.  Reinforcement 
learning is a mathematical framework that allows for the shaping of the actions of a 
theoretical ‘agent’ via rewards and punishments, a variant of reinforcement learning, 
GM-SARSA uses task-modules. The task modules used by the RL agent can be thought 
of as being analogous to a set of task-specific state-action representations that use visual 
information to control behavior.  In particular, I will later show (Chapter 8) how fixations 
on a speedometer and on a car one wishes to follow can be considered as a source of 
information for separate task modules that jointly try to control the lane-position and 
velocity of a car.  
 
UNCERTAINTY 
Given our review of the study of reward and its behavioral and theoretical 
importance for eye movements, I’ll now turn to uncertainty and how it can also be used 
to drive eye movements.  Uncertainty is a rather vague term but given the context of 
reinforcement learning, I’ll operationally define uncertainty as a measure that 
corresponds to the probability associated with a belief that the world is in a given state.  
Sensory systems must deal with noise in the signal being observed, the sensory apparatus, 
and any other internal factors (such as memory decay or the signal becoming outdated).  
Uncertainty and information entropy are deeply related in that something with high 
entropy means that you are uncertain of the outcome of that signal and will need to use 
more bits of information to describe it.  For instance, the outcome of flipping a fair coin 
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has one bit of information (either the coin is heads or tails) any deviation from a 50/50 
means that on average you would need to transmit less information (in the limit zero bits 
if the probability were 100% heads or tails as you would know the outcome without a 
measurement).   
Within the visual system there are many points at which uncertainty can enter.  
For instance, Najemnik & Geisler (2005) measured target visibility over multiple 
locations on the retina to quantify the information available in the peripheral retina to an 
observer.  This knowledge and the natural scene statistics that the target is embedded in 
can be used to build probability distributions for a Bayesian ideal observer that can take 
into account peripheral uncertainty to optimize a search process to foveate a target.  
Importantly, the ideal observer’s fixation strategies were quite similar to human 
observers, suggesting that the human visual system uses similar estimates of peripheral 
uncertainty in eye movement planning. Renninger-Walker, Verghese and Coughlin 
(2007) developed a model of eye movements that used an entropy measure of object 
features to model how human observers foveate and remember complex visual shapes.  
They designed a model that tried to foveate a shape in a manner that was optimized to 
reduce global shape uncertainty.  In their study they found that while human observers do 
not appear to foveate targets in a way that reduces global uncertainty it is consistent with 
reducing local uncertainty.   Senders (1983) also formulated an entropy based uncertainty 
model of visual information accrual during driving.  Using a set of measures and 
parameters concerning how much data is present on a road, how fast this info can be 
absorbed and how soon it is outdated or forgotten he was able to establish a relationship 
between the velocity a car traveled and information flux over time.  Senders 
demonstrated that given these information rates, one could predict a relationship between 
driving performance (how fast the car goes) and the amount of time available to gather 
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information.  His general finding was that human drivers self-regulate their speed, 
contingent on information flow (e.g. if information flow is disrupted via a blackout 
period they will drive slow down in a systematic manner).  
Studies that have examined the role of uncertainty in eye movement planning (and 
other in hand movement planning) suggest that human behavior is (unsurprisingly) 
affected by uncertainty and (more interestingly) tends to adapt in a manner that uses 
information about this uncertainty in a rational way that is at times near optimal.  It is 
worth mentioning briefly that the Sprague and Ballard scheduling model also represents 
uncertainty.  As mentioned above although there are many avenues within the sensory 
pathways to introduce uncertainty, in this model uncertainty is represented as a 
probability distribution with a given mean and variance that corresponds to the level of 
confidence that an agent has that the world is in a particular state.   Unlike Najemnik and 
Geisler we do not determine uncertainty introduced by the sensory apparatus or target 
contrast or Walker-Renninger et al due to target shape complexity.  In the scheduling 
model, uncertainty is best thought of a sensory estimate stored in memory whose mean 
and variance may respectively drift and increase when no new sensory information is 
required. 
To summarize, we have now considered the role of rewards and uncertainty in 
neural activity and human behavior and have laid out most of the framework for how one 
might choose to design a computational model of goal directed vision thus setting the 
stage for discussing the scheduling model in depth.  However, before I discuss these 
computational models, in the next chapter I’ll discuss behavioral findings for gaze 
behavior during driving to help provide a context for the behavioral results in my driving 
experiments and to help motivate why particular task-modules were chosen for the 
scheduling model of gaze selection in driving. 
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4. Visual behavior in driving 
Given the past chapters review of human visual attention and representation of 
reward and uncertainty in behavior and computational modeling, I’ll now take a closer 
look at prior research on human visual attention in driving.  There have been several 
studies of behavior in driving, both in then real world and simulated scenarios. This 
section offers a review of the task-based eye movement strategies seen in driving as well 
as some proposals for modeling human car navigation.  
Behavioral studies of driving are too numerous to provide a comprehensive 
overview here.  In this section I focus on those studies that incorporated eye tracking and 
either brought to light some aspect of task specific behavior or attentional limitations 
during driving. While the Sprague & Ballard scheduling model is intended as a generic 
explanation of task-driven visual behavior, by its nature it is assumed that the 
implementer has a priori knowledge of the task relevant variables to be acquired from the 
environment.  The studies here cover a good basic level description of human eye 
movements while driving and provide justification for possible control variables to use in 
the scheduling model.  I’ve loosely broken this chapter up into sections on eye movement 
behavior and models of control, but they are necessarily overlapping subjects. 
 
EYE MOVEMENTS IN DRIVING 
Because of the ubiquitous nature of cars in industrial society, driving behavior 
and the nature of eye movements while driving have been studied extensively. Early 
mobile eye tracking technology allowed Mourant and Rockwell (1970) to study free 
driving and car following behavior.  In particular they were interested in how familiarity 
changes visual scanning. They found (albeit partially due to their instructions) that when 
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unfamiliar, subjects tend to spend more time on landmarks off the road and gradually 
focus more on the road primarily near the horizon as their experience increases.  They 
also found that when following, a lead car occupies a large amount of fixation time 
compared to other cars in free driving scenarios.  A follow-up study further examined the 
role of experience by comparing novice and experienced drivers.  The novices were still 
learning to drive in a driver’s education course and afforded some unique insights into the 
visual computations used by drivers.  For instance, novices tend to fixate lane markers at 
a much higher rate, suggesting a learning process to use peripheral information for lane 
positioning.  Novices also fixated a smaller portion of the scene mainly on the nearby 
road and cars, while experience drivers fixated a wider swath of the scene on and off road 
and also made more fixations on mirrors.   
Underwood, Chapman, Brocklehurst, and Crundall (2003) had novice and 
experienced subjects drive in the real world while being eye tracked.  Note that in their 
study the ‘novice’ drivers had up to two years experience making them more familiar 
than the novice subjects used by Mourant & Rockwell. They examined the distribution of 
fixations on the road by dividing visual space on the road into near, middle and far 
segments,  as well ones to the left, straight ahead and to the right, as well as categories for 
mirror looks and other objects.  Via 2-step Markov transition analysis, they found that 
inexperienced drivers tend to frequently transition to a point on the far road ahead, 
whereas experienced drivers’ transitions were less uniform in the final point they would 
transition to indicating that they have more complex scan paths possibly due to 
heightened situational awareness.  They also analyzed fixation scan paths of three 
consecutive fixations and found several reliable patterns. Both groups used a strategy of 
looking at the middle distance ahead, to the far distance ahead, and back.  Checks to the 
side, i.e. fixating the road ahead, then the left or right, and back, were more prominent 
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among experienced drivers. Additionally, in some situations experienced drivers 
exhibited scan paths with mirror checks more frequently. 
Victor, Harbluk, and Engstrom (2005) had subjects drive in simulations and the 
real world while simultaneously performing an auditory or visual distractor task.  They 
found that the distractor task and increasing task difficulty yielded longer fixation times 
and subjects spent more time fixating the road center, thus resulting in reduced scan path 
ranges.  These results suggest that if a distractor task interferes, vision defaults to a 
central position on the road near the horizon at the expense of further checks around the 
scene at off-road objects, such as pedestrians. 
White and Caird (2010) looked at variety of factors (riding with a passenger, 
conversation with the passenger) that could lead to distraction and failures to detect an 
unexpected pedestrian or motorcycle.  They found several main effects of distractors 
increasing the likelihood of missing events.  However, they found no effect in the 
fixations (number and rate of fixations) produced with or without detection, which they 
suggest may mean that some level of processing is not engaged despite fixation strategies 
being similar.  While gaze frequency can be a misleading metric due to errors in fixation 
detection, it is tempting to consider the idea that subjects’ attentional scheduling was 
disrupted so that appropriate visual routines or computations were not engaged or perhaps 
delayed despite the eye being in the ‘right’ location. 
 
VISUAL CONTROL MODELS OF DRIVING 
Senders (1983) conducted a series of driving experiments and formulated a model 
based on information accumulation that is conceptually quite similar to the Sprague and 
Ballard scheduling model.  Senders created a helmet with a motor system to control a 
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shutter that could block out vision at different rates and durations.  He hypothesized that 
for a given speed and difficulty of a roadway, individuals have a maximum ‘information 
black out’ period that they can stand without decreasing performance (i.e. maintaining a 
constant velocity).  Somewhat astoundingly, he tested the system on American highways 
(albeit with a backup driver) and closed racecourses.  Senders found that driving speed 
and the black out delay period are related by a curve with roughly exponential decay.  
Subjects could drive relatively well (maximum speed of 50-60mph to about half 
maximum speed) with a black out of roughly 0-4 seconds.  Longer delay periods, up to 
9s, resulted in a precipitous drop-off in speed where subjects drove largely at 20mph or 
under.   These results give insights that can inform our application of the Sprague & 
Ballard model; First, human predictions about the state of the world with even relatively 
long periods without sensory updates can be still good enough to drive a vehicle (albeit 
sometimes with some slow down) and that a visual refresh generally needs to occur at 
least every four seconds for behavior to be unaffected.  This suggests that a Kalman filter 
(conceptually similar to Sender’s information accrual and loss model) or a leaky 
integrator (which Sender’s proposed but did not label as such) may not be a bad 
approximation for human state estimation error and provides a plausible decay rate for 
memory (and growth for uncertainty) to use for a model of information absorption and 
decay. 
Senders did not have access to eye trackers at the time and the nature of the visual 
features that must be refreshed for appropriate control has been illuminated by later 
research. For example, Land & Lee (1994) examined the behavior of real world drivers 
and found a relationship between curve navigation and eye position.  As drivers navigate 
into and through a curve they tend to fixate a tangent point of the inside of the curve. 
Additionally, they demonstrated that knowledge of the car’s heading and the tangent 
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point position are sufficient to provide a control signal that could be used for steering.  
This effect and its contribution to steering performance have been studied by several 
other researchers and has been shown to recur, although with somewhat mixed results 
depending on the visual features available to the driver (Mars 2008, Kandil, Rotter, 
Lappe 2009). 
Land & Horwood (1995) had a subsequent study using a driving simulator that 
specifically varied the availability of near and far visual information. They found 
evidence supporting the idea that near field information is used for lane positioning and 
far information gives road curvature information that can be used for planning and 
anticipation of a driving route.  As noted above, other researchers have found mixed 
evidence for how frequently the tangent point is fixated. Wilkie and Wann (2003) and 
Robertshaw and Wilkie (2008) claim subjects in simulations infrequently fixate the 
tangent point during curve negotiation.  Instead tangent point fixations may instead be 
reflect part of a more dominant steering strategy whereby ‘gaze sampling’ can be used 
with an error nulling strategy to guide the future heading of the car.  However, Kandil et 
al tested their hypothesis in real world driving and found that their gaze sampling 
explanation appears to be an artifact of the sparse virtual environment used and subjects’ 
real world steering performance is improved with tangent point information.  
Salvucci and Liu (2002) examined highway lane changing behavior in a simulator 
and found regularities in gaze behavior across subjects.  Before initiating a pass subjects 
initially focused primarily on their current lane of occupancy, and gradually shifted gaze 
to their new lane to achieve a near equal ratio of gaze time on the old and new lane. After 
a successful pass subjects’ returned the car to the non-passing lane.  In this portion of the 
pass, subjects started out with similar gaze time ratios between the passing and non-
passing lanes prior to returning to the non-passing lane, but they rapidly increased of 
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fixations on the non-passing lane well before initiating steering into that lane.  One way 
to interpret this data is that when passing another car, its presence is enough to warrant 
several looks (possibly checking for a change in motion) but the driver must also guide 
the car into the passing lane resulting in near equal ratios of looks of passing-lane to non-
passing lane during the pass execution.  However, when the car has been successfully 
passed, the driver’s primary goal is to navigate the car to the non-passing lane and as 
such gaze predominates on that lane. 
Building on the research of Land and Lee, Salvucci and Gray (2004) proposed a 
computational model of steering similar to Land and Lee’s two-stage model with near 
and far visual information.  Using the relative angle between a car and nearby lane 
markers and the relative angle between a car and far road curvature can provide sufficient 
information for successful road following.  In similar research, Andersen and Sauer 
(2007) proposed a visually based velocity control algorithm that uses the visual angle of a 
car to be followed.  This visual angle value along with knowledge of vehicle speed 
(perhaps derived from ego-motion estimates from optic flow) are sufficient to provide 
controls signals to a PID velocity controller to approximate human behavior. 
Salvucci in particular (2006,2008), has been quite active in studying and 
modeling human driving behavior and the larger issue of task scheduling.  He has 
presented a ‘multithreaded theory of cognition’ that is conceptually is quite similar to the 
Sprague & Ballard scheduling model.  To briefly summarize his views: Cognition is 
limited in that multiple threads can be ‘idle in the background,’ but only one at a given 
time is ‘active’ and gets full processing.  In his language, threads can be any number of 
perceptual or cognitive processes, i.e. collecting new information, executing a motor 
command, or acting on declarative or procedural memory.  Threads can interfere with 
one another depending on the resources they require and additionally threads require a 
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process where their execution and termination is arbitrated.  Priority of execution is given 
to threads that haven’t run recently. His attentional model of driving incorporates 
mechanisms for perception, decision-making, and action selection.  His implementation 
uses the Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational model (ACT-R), a computational 
cognitive architecture that has a long history of development (Anderson 1996).  The goal 
of ACT-R is to replicate human cognition largely via symbolic and logical processing 
using rule-based systems in coordination with perceptual and memory and retrieval 
models based on human behavioral and neural data.  By using a combination of features 
of ACT-R and his own control models (such as the 2-point steering control), he has been 
able to produce a simulation that reproduces human gaze switching and steering 
behavior.  
The prior driving research reviewed here provides a basis for determining the set 
of visual tasks humans must allocate attention to while driving.  These seem to fall in the 
categories of lane/path guidance, checks on other vehicles, instrumentation and roadside 
objects such as pedestrians. In general, when driving a straight course, drivers frequently 
scan the road ahead near the horizon and less so near the car.  While navigating curves, 
scene elements like road curvature and a gaze sampling servoing mechanism can provide 
stable visual references for steering control.  These elements of steering behavior have 
been largely validated as common information sources among drivers as well as 
successfully implemented in Land and Lee’s near/far model and Salvucci and Liu’s 2-
point control model of driving.  Navigation and following of other cars has been explored 
via the 2-point model where another car can act as a far point, and in models by Anderson 
et al and Salgian & Ballard (1998) using the visual angle a lead cars to aid velocity 
control.  Looks to check mirrors and far lanes or roadside objects are less well understood 
but tend to be more frequent with experience, suggesting that they involve separate 
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learned processes to check these states of the world.  These results suggest that a first 
approximation to the task set present in human driving behavior can be thought of in 
terms of avoidance and following of objects, as well as a variety of checks on the world 
state (pedestrians, intersections, instruments) to inform avoidance and following 
behavior. 
From a control systems perspective, I have highlighted some algorithms that 
allow navigation with rather sparse visual information.  However, in terms of scheduling 
these ‘task modules,’ only Salvucci’s model has attempted to provide a comprehensive 
explanation for navigation and gaze behavior and it is worth discussing the fundamental 
differences between our approaches. 
While Salvucci’s results are impressive, the implementation in the ACT-R 
architecture makes it difficult to ascertain how reward and perceptual uncertainty are 
incorporated.  Because of ACT-R’s memory architecture, uncertainty is implicitly present 
and the perceptual system approximates foveated vision allowing for a graded level of 
input depending on a visual cues distance from the fovea.  While uncertainty may be 
manipulated within the framework, it is not actively promoted as a key factor in the eye 
movement decision-making process. Salvucci discusses the idea that ACT-R memory 
parameters are set up such that threads concerning driving are well-learned, analogous to 
an experienced driver.  However, the model does not incorporate any explicit reward-
based metrics from such learning that are used directly by the task scheduler.   Since the 
concepts of reward and uncertainty are at best implicit in his model it is difficult to know 
how it would apply to the experimental manipulations we undertook.  Historically, ACT-
R has been mainly used by cognition researchers for inferential reasoning and its 
application is largely absent from most vision research.  ACT-R is at this point a highly 
complex piece of programming and although admirable in its goal to capture the entirety 
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of human cognition, it’s complexity can make parsimony difficult and it lacks 
transparency in its algorithms due to the fact that it is attempting to model a much larger 
piece of behavior than just visual task switching which I address in this dissertation.  
In this light, the proposed experiments and the application of the Sprague & 
Ballard model can be seen as complementary to Salvucci’s approach.  His model’s 
architecture successfully predicts and fits human gaze and navigation data, but he did not 
emphasize reward and uncertainty, nor is it clear how these variables should be added to 
the model.  While the Sprague & Ballard scheduling model is simplistic compared to 
ACT-R’s ambition of a simulating a comprehensive computational representation human 
cognition, its simplicity provides a greater level of transparency to computational 
modelers unfamiliar with ACT-R’s considerable development history and those who 
might seek to re-implement our scheduling algorithm it or modify it.   While Salvucci’s 
work has been applied to driver distraction, e.g. predicting interference due to cell phone 
use, reward and uncertainty have only been implicitly manipulated in his behavioral 
experiments.  We take an approach conceptually more similar to other experiments (e.g. 
Zhang, Morvan, Maloney, 2010 and Schlicht & Schrater, 2009) where these parameters 
are explicitly controlled and varied. The experiments and modeling described in the 
following chapters are geared towards addressing task scheduling and any influence 
reward and uncertainty might play.  Such experiments should provide a reasonable 
proving ground for verifying or refuting aspects of the Sprague & Ballard scheduling 
model and provide inspiration for future behavioral experiments and modifications to the 
model. 
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5. Computational Models of Eye Movements 
 
STIMULUS DRIVEN MODELS 
Given our review of eye movements in behavior now we can focus on the 
different theories proposed to model human visual attention.  In general, these models 
tend to run on a continuum from purely stimulus driven to task driven. One major aspect 
of visual attention modeling has been concerned with defining and computing salience, 
i.e. visual features that human observers tend to look at. Salience is a generic term 
researchers have applied to image processing techniques that would allow some metric 
ranking of image features in terms of conspicuity.  In general terms, salience maps are 
organized as hierarchical energy filter banks. Each filter processes a certain feature (e.g. 
edges or color contrast) and the output from each bank is combined and a score can be 
given to an image location that hypothetically would attract attention (Itti & Koch 1998). 
The term itself can be somewhat misleading since there are several different 
formulations.  The Itti & Koch model has been refined further by Itti & Baldi (2005, 
2006) who proposed a Bayesian information-theoretic model of salience where the output 
from feature detectors is statistically captured over time. Deviations from expectations 
derived from the past statistics of saliency can be measured to form a ‘surprise’ metric 
that can drive fixations.  Similarly, Bruce & Tsotsos (2009) developed information-
theoretic saliency maps based on self-information, where local patches are evaluated on 
how well they can code neighborhood patches.  Areas that are poor predictors of the rest 
of the image are considered salient. Kanan, Tong Zhang and Cottrell (2009) use a similar 
metric but compare patches against a database of natural image statistics instead of just 
the local image. 
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There have been several studies to examine how much of a correlation exists 
between such the output of saliency maps and eye movements of human observers 
(Parkhurst, Law & Neiber 2002, Itti & Koch 2001).  Typically, these experiments involve 
human observers ‘free-looking’ at visual scene or movie.  In these scenarios saliency 
does explain some proportion of fixations (50-70%) and metrics that incorporate 
information theoretic principles do best (Renniger-Walker et al 2007; Bruce & Tostos 
2009, 2010; Itti & Baldi 2008). However, these studies and others (Foulsham & 
Underwood 2008, Harding & Bloj 2010) have found that while salience can explain 
fixations better than a random fixation model it does not sufficiently describe human 
fixation behavior.  For instance, Tatler and Vincent (2009) found that an oculomotor bias 
model of fixation selection, i.e. a centrally biased Gaussian, predicts more fixations than 
a variety of salience metrics despite their model having zero image knowledge. They also 
showed that predicting eye movements from one observer with another observers fixation 
data provides one of the best fits indicating salience models fails to capture the behavioral 
and task biases that human observers have. 
Given the deficiencies of stimulus driven control in explaining fixation patterns, 
we must consider the effect of goals on human eye movements. It is worth noting that 
salience model experiments typically involve free viewing, where an observer is assumed 
to be operating in a ‘task-free’ mode, but even in this circumstance salience does not 
always adequately describe fixation behavior. In more natural circumstances where 
subjects are free to move around and have explicit goals this problem becomes more 
pronounced.   
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GOAL DRIVEN MODELS 
There have been a variety of models applied to visual search in particular (instead 
of free-viewing) that employ some measure of top-down control. Visual search by 
definition requires at least a basic top-down signal to initiate the search for a target 
stimulus.  Based on early studies of covert attention, Wolfe (2004) proposed a model 
called guided search, which proposes that subjects use isolated features and combinations 
thereof to filter an image to find likely target candidates.  In this scheme, visual search 
can be strongly influenced by image features depending on the similarity of the visual 
target with the features of other visual items. However, Wolfe’s model is largely 
conceptual and while it qualitatively predicts human results, it is not a mathematical 
algorithm.  Other search models, also mentioned in Chapter 2, (Najemnik and Geisler 
2005, Renniger-Walker et al 2007) have focused on principled methods to create image 
processing models using Bayesian inference and concepts from information theory to 
derive strategies for maximizing percent correct target detection in search and/or 
reducing uncertainty.   Saliency models have also been retrofitted with elements of top-
down control.  For instance, Itti (unpublished, NETI 2008) and Borji, Sihite and Ittii 
(2011) used a combination of saliency maps and fixation maps collected from observers 
to improve predictions of fixations from subjects in a variety of tasks. However, its 
important to note that while saliency in these cases has been grafted together with top-
down knowledge, it is done so in a machine-learning classification framework. Their 
general approach has been to use prerecorded human fixation patterns and combine them 
with saliency map results to generate a hybrid map.  From a classification standpoint this 
approach is valid as it will explain more data, however it does not present a useful 
process model for why the human visual system generates these top-down biases in the 
first place.   
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While top-down control can be conceptualized as a dynamic filter that uses task-
related features to find a set of viable fixation targets, our ultimate goal is to understand 
how humans organize and deploy these visual filters over time while engaged in complex 
tasks.  For instance, while making a sandwich how do we store and execute the plan to 
find ingredients, control utensils, and actually make the food?  Similarly while walking, 
how is it decided that a fixation should be on a pedestrian versus an obstacle on the road? 
There are many levels to address this problem at.  For instance, from an object 
discrimination perspective, one might ask how are task-based filters learned (Geisler, 
Najemnik, and Ing 2009).  Goal directed human vision can also be approached from the 
perspective of a set of serial ``visuo-motor task modules,'' sometimes referred to as visual 
routines (Ballard et al 1997, Ullman 1984). These modules perform very specific 
computations in isolation (e.g., finding a road landmark to control steering), but when 
coordinated over time with other modules, complex behaviors can be achieved.  Similar 
to the computation of feature filters, it is an open question as to what the nature of visual 
routines are (if they exist) and how are they computed.  Determining local image 
algorithms to generate task filters is an interesting aspect of computer vision research, but 
the main topic of my research will focus how they might be scheduled in time. 
Instead of focusing on the low level implementation of task-based filters or visual 
computations, let us consider a type of model where visual information and eye 
movements are processed and executed serially but the actual image based computation is 
abstracted. In this approach, a scheduling problem arises: What visuo-motor 
computations should be carried out and when should they be executed? The research in 
this dissertation addresses the scheduling problem, by examining human behavior in 
setting where top-down influence is quite pronounced and then extending a task 
scheduling model (Sprague & Ballard 2007) that has been previously applied to a 
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simulated walking task.  In this prior research it was demonstrated that a scheduling 
algorithm can help rationally drive a computer agent’s behavior, however it has not been 
sufficiently tested against human participants to know if it is a viable model compared to 
the other techniques listed above. 
The Sprague & Ballard model is quite different from other current models of 
visual attention or search and is perhaps more aptly described as a model of visual 
cognition.  The model provides a purely top-down explanation for the deployment of 
gaze and unlike most other models, it explicitly deals with how one should arbitrate 
between multiple visual tasks and explicitly represents the perceptual-motor loop such 
that eye movements are partially generated by their utility with respect to motor action.  
In the section below, I discuss the Sprague & Ballard scheduling model in detail and how 
it can be applied to my particular experiments in driving. 
 
SPRAGUE & BALLARD SCHEDULING MODEL 
I will first present a general overview of the Sprague and Ballard model before 
providing more details on the exact algorithm and finish by detailing how it can be 
extended to a driving scenario. The Sprague & Ballard scheduling model is a modular 
task-based framework for simulating visuo-motor interactions using distinct perceptual 
and motor systems.  In their model, a reinforcement learning agent learns a mapping 
between task-relevant visual features in the world and a set of behavioral actions that can 
be executed.  The Sprague and Ballard model was previously used to simulate walking in 
an environment where a virtual agent had to mange three visual tasks that were required 
for successful navigation. The agent walked down a sidewalk with obstacles and litter to 
be picked up. Their scheduling algorithm has distinct perceptual and motor components.  
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Visual computations were broken down into components for avoidance of 
obstacles, picking up items and sidewalk following. Each of these modules had a 
dedicated visual computation that found the distance and angle to the sidewalk, obstacles 
and litter. The motor system used this state information to navigate (turn left, turn right or 
go straight) using a control policy learned via reinforcement learning1.  This setup is 
similar to the subsumption architecture in robotics (sets of hierarchical task specific 
modules) proposed by Brooks (1986). A core difference between these approaches is that 
Sprague and Ballard proposed two new algorithms for deciding module action selection 
and sensory updating. 
In a manner designed to be analogous to human foveation, only one visual module 
at a time can run to get a new update of state information. Idle modules are allowed to 
update their representations via a Kalman filter, introducing uncertainty into their state 
estimates. The perceptual arbitration system selects a module to be updated with new 
sensory information. Crucially, the perceptual arbitration algorithm uses reward estimates 
from the motor component and estimates of state uncertainty in the perceptual system to 
choose which module to update. Figure 1 shows a flow chart diagram of the perception 
action loop modeled by the algorithm and its components are discussed below. While 
there is no direct neural evidence for the exact modules proposed here, the task-based 
nature of vision (i.e. visual routines and strong attentional effects) and the functional 
localization of visual areas, in particular the different neural substrates for eye 
                                                
1 Note, although reinforcement learning is used to generate a framework, which explicitly represents a 
reward, other control systems are completely viable as long as one can generate a cost function that 
describes the value of the agent’s current state, e.g. using a PID controller and having the distance to its set 
point used as a proxy for reward. 
 
 37 
movements types (i.e. smooth pursuit vs. saccades) suggest that modules may be 
physically plausible in addition to being a convenient conceptual and mathematical tool. 
 
Figure 1: Flow diagram of the task-module architecture.  
Following the numeric labels, (1) the system initializes with a set of sensory readings about the world.  
Each task module has a representation of their state space that is (2) mapped to a learned action policy via 
the GM-SARSA algorithm.  This mapping allows the driving agent to (3) output a steering and velocity 
command to drive the car.  These actions (4) take have some effect in the world that changes the world 
state.  (5) Using information on potential rewards and state uncertainty, the perceptual arbitration 
algorithm chooses the module most in need of update to its world state estimate. (6) In this example the Car 
Following module is chosen to be updated and is able to gain access to new sensory information.  The 
other modules cannot update and are forced to propagate estimates of their world state using a Kalman 
filter. This perception and action loop repeats itself each time step as the driving agent traverses through 
the environment. 
!
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There are three core assumptions in the model that shape how it performs, 
concerning visual task-modules, a sensory-motor reward mapping, and perceptual 
uncertainty.  First, it is assumed that overt visual attention has an internal parallel 
component and an external serial component. Internally, a human or simulated agent may 
have several independent and concurrent visual tasks, which they call task-modules. In 
their walking simulations, these modules were obstacle, litter and sidewalk detection. It is 
assumed that a small collection of modules can be internally active in parallel. However, 
the purpose of the modules is to gather information from the world to guide behavior. 
Each module needs updates of a specific task-relevant piece of information and it is 
assumed that the modules can only operate serially in the external world to collect new 
perceptual information. Since only one module runs at a time to gather new information 
the selection and execution of a module is considered to be analogous to overt visual 
attention. Prior research suggests that although human vision has massively parallel 
inputs, we can model it in a very simplified way by focusing only on foveal vision. This 
assumption is based on the studies mentioned in Chapter 2, as well as others that suggest 
that due to task demands, attentional and memory limitations, visuo-motor operations act 
in a serial and discrete fashion to redirecting the fovea (Hayhoe & Ballard 2005).  The 
model can be seen as a continuation of prior work outlining active vision strategies where 
specific and discrete pieces of visual information are gathered ‘just-in-time’ with ongoing 
task demands (Ballard et al 1997).  Importantly, because of the serial execution of the 
modules, a scheduler is required to organize when modules access new perceptual 
information from the world.  This arbitration process is discussed below. 
Secondly, the scheduling model assumes that task-modules serve to provide 
information that can be acted on by a motor system.  In their walking simulation, the 
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obstacle-detection module gathered distance and relative angle information about the 
closest obstacle.  Given this information and a sensory-motor mapping, the walking agent 
could choose to turn left, right or go straight to avoid the obstacle.  This mapping is 
learned via reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto 1998) a goal-focused learning 
framework that directly models the interaction between a learner and the environment. 
RL finds a mapping between a current environmental state and an appropriate action to 
execute in that state based on a reward structure in the environment.  Importantly, the 
choice of which action to execute is based on expected rewards learned over time.  By 
explicitly modeling reward, actions have a metric by which to be evaluated (e.g. what 
turning action has the highest payoff given the state of the world?) and this reward 
knowledge can subsequently be used by the perceptual system to make an informed 
decision about what task-module should be executed. There are numerous studies (see 
Chapter 3) that have demonstrated reinforcement learning’s value both as a model of 
behavioral choice, in particular for eye movements, but also a possible correlate of neural 
activity.  While the use of reinforcement learning in the Sprague & Ballard model is for 
the learning of a control mapping between vision and motor systems and does not 
explicitly address how eye movement patterns might be learned online, the connection to 
this prior work is important in that it is assumed there is a reward representation.  
The last assumption of the model concerns perceptual uncertainty.  Reinforcement 
learning provides a mapping between the current world state and actions. If there are 
errors in determining the world state, the actions selected may be inappropriate.  There 
are two sources of uncertainty present in their formulation, external (perceptual) and 
internal (memory).  In Sprague & Ballard’s walking simulations external uncertainty was 
present since each visual task-module used an inexact computer vision algorithm to 
determine the state of the world for that module.  In their experiments this uncertainty 
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was treated as intrinsic and sufficiently small that RL could still learn a useful sensory-
motor mapping.  Once a module executes and gets new information from the world, these 
sensor readings are stored internally but are gradually corrupted by internal memory 
noise.  Each module has its own state space and they model uncertainty in the state space 
estimate via a Kalman filter, which estimates multiple sensor readings as a Gaussian 
distribution with a mean and variance.  This allows a prediction of movement through the 
state space, since as the agent walks forward objects in the world shift.  Additionally, it 
provides a rational framework for updating a state estimate given prior knowledge and 
any new sensory information that is available.  If one module executes, it will initially 
have a good perceptual state estimate, a mean with effectively zero variance.  However, if 
the module is not subsequently activated on each time step, the Kalman filter updates its 
prediction for how the state space will change and these estimates can be further altered 
by parameters in the filter or adding noise if a module’s uncertainty is desired to grow at 
a certain rate. 
Combined together, these assumptions set the framework for the scheduling 
algorithm. Given a reward based visuo-motor mapping, serially executed visual task-
modules, and estimates of perceptual uncertainty, a scheduler or perceptual arbitration 
algorithm can defined.  The scheduler works via estimates of loss, in other words if a 
module needs to be selected to run, the one which has the most to lose should be updated.  
By using reward estimates and the distribution of uncertainty each module can 
individually be evaluated as an uncertainty weighted expected reward.  The scheduler 
evaluates each module comparing the maximum possible reward an individual model 
would be associated with versus the global expected reward across other modules.  This 
comparison allows a loss estimate to be calculated that gives a ranking for each module 
 41 
describing how much reward it expects to lose given its current level of uncertainty if it’s 
not updated.  
PERCEPTUAL ARBITRATION ALGORITHM 
Here I will present the Sprague and Ballard scheduling or perceptual arbitration 
algorithm in the context of the reinforcement-learning framework from Chapter 3. In the 
initial stage the learning agent (LA) is allowed to learn a set of Q-tables where the LA 
always has access to accurate state information. This is not the always true in a real task 
such as driving, where a human driver with limited visual resources must fixate specific 
targets over time to resolve their true locations or speeds. Once the Q-tables have been 
learned we can incorporate the notion of state uncertainty into our model. 
Instead of making a decision based on perfect state knowledge, the LA maintains 
an estimate sit for each task module i in the driving simulation. This state estimate 
consists of a Gaussian probability distribution over the entire state space; the most likely 
state of the world corresponds to the mean of this distribution, but the world might have 
changed since the LA last took an accurate state measurement (e.g., by foveating some 
object like another car). In our case the premise is that a Kalman filter has continual mean 
and variance predictions of the location of the agent in each module’s state space.  If a 
module is not allowed to update, the Kalman gain is set to zero, which allows predictions 
to be propagated into the future without new sensory information.  The Kalman filter is 
initialized with estimates of covariance matrices of the noise present in the measurement 
system and the signal being observed, dependent on these parameters the variance will 
grow in proportion to how large these estimates are. 
When choosing an action, the LA multiplies its state estimate distribution with the 
learned Q-tables, yielding an expected value metric. For a given task module b, the loss 
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 incurred for not updating a module b's state estimate has two components, the 
summed expected gain from updating module b and not updating the other modules 
subtracted from the gain expected  if all modules were updated and the best action 
a* was chosen to maximize reward from the current imperfect state knowledge: 
This loss function can be used to guide the LA's perceptual resources during a 
simulation by updating the module with the greatest expected loss.  Notice that 
uncertainty is implicit in this equation as it is assumed that we can probabilistically 
sample a candidate state from module b to get the ‘true reward’ we would receive if 
module b were updated.  As stated above, for all other modules we can compute the 
expected value, i.e. the probability of reward multiplied by its magnitude, to sum with our 
initial prediction to yield an overall payoff would be to let only module b update. 
Now, I will briefly describe how the Sprague & Ballard methodology can be 
applied to our simulated driving task but will provide a more detailed description of the 
model in Chapter 8. In comparison to walking, the driving requires a more complex and 
dynamic state space and has more task modules to address the greater variety of available 
tasks while driving.   
To predict human eye movements we have used both a one (velocity) or two 
controller (velocity and lane position) vehicle control system using the reinforcement 
learning architecture to drive the car and a sensor update scheduling system that controls 
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when the driving agent should update its estimate of its world state.  With perfect 
knowledge of the state of the world, the vehicle control system should operate as well as 
possible given the limitations of its various sub-systems and the parameters chosen for 
the RL model. During training, state space measurements are veridical and there are no 
uncertainties regarding the RL driving agent’s location in the state space. Once the 
vehicle control mapping is learned, the sensor system has memory noise introduced the 
use of a Kalman filter for the state space estimates.  The sensor must make a decision at 
each time step (every ~200ms) on which task’s state space estimate should be refined, i.e. 
uncertainty is reduced.  The sensor system must learn the appropriate scheduling of  ‘eye 
movements’ to maintain a world state representation that allows the vehicle control 
system to successfully operate. Note, unlike Sprague & Ballard’s implementation the 
modules here do not use any computer vision algorithms, we assume there are visual 
operations that can be abstracted such that the provide appropriate state space information 
(directly from the simulation) without actual image processing. 
We have tried a variety of modules that consist of at most one module each for 
avoidance of cars, following cars, and a forward progress module to monitor velocity. To 
provide an easy mapping between the model and experiments, our final model only used 
two modules, following and velocity monitoring.  The avoidance and follow module use 
lane position, velocity, and distance to other cars as part of their state space 
representations. The forward progress module only represents the current velocity.  The 
vehicle control system consists of three actions for increasing, decreasing, or maintaining 
a velocity as well as a steering system for changing lanes.  During learning, each module 
gradually refines its estimate for the associated reward with a given sensor state and a 
selected action. With the appropriate reward functions, a reinforcement learner can use 
these representations to drive in a very simplified world.   
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After learning, the scheduler algorithm and state uncertainty are introduced.  
Given the learned reward tables and perceptual uncertainty, on each time step the 
scheduler will determine which visual-task module is in most need of an update.  Again, 
Figure 1 compactly summarizes the information flow in the driving scheduling model.   
Given this knowledge of the general approaches used to model human fixation 
selection and our specific interest in comparing the Sprague and Ballard scheduling 
model’s predictions with an human gaze data, we can now finally discuss the core 
experiments of this dissertation and subsequent computational modeling of this data. 
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6. Experiment 1 – Reward and task effects in driving 
 
MOTIVATION 
Given the general framework for the scheduling algorithm, how would it be 
applied to a task other than walking and how would its predictions be tested against 
human gaze behavior?  Experiment 1 had two main goals: To develop and validate that 
our lab’s driving simulator could be feasible for such experiments and to test if human 
drivers would reliably display sensitivity to a task/reward manipulation in the 
environment.    
While experiments by Sprague et al (2007) and Rothkopf et al (2007) respectively 
demonstrated the viability of applying the scheduling model in a simulation and 
explaining human navigation while walking in virtual reality, the prior implementations 
did not address the model’s predictions of gaze behavior.  It is instructive to compare 
these prior experiments to the current. 
Walking is rather slow paced and the timing of fixations is less demanding than in 
driving since there is more time to gather information.  The prior experiments did not use 
dynamic objects, which allowed simplified state space representations. Rothkopf et al’s 
walking experiment needed four modules (avoidance, pickup litter, sidewalk following, 
and forward progress) to adequately describe human navigation data. It is not clear how 
well the model scales in situations with more available tasks.  Lastly, while Sprague 
(2006) presented preliminary evidence in support of the model for predicting a single 
participant’s gaze distributions in a simple 2-D ‘game’ experiment, its predictions have 
not been further vetted with application to other natural tasks or in comparison to other 
models of visual attention.  Due to these observations and technical advancements in our 
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lab, driving was considered to be a viable experimental context.  Our lab has a driving 
simulator (described in detail in the methods section below) that allows subjects to be 
eye-tracked while seated in a car cab and immersed in an virtual urban driving 
environment.  Driving has demanding timing constraints and while complex, prior 
research on driving control models (Chapter 8) suggest it is possible to decompose into 
visuo-motor task modules. 
The primary aim of Experiment 1 was to develop an experimental protocol within 
the driving context that would clearly show a task dependent change in gaze strategy as 
well as serve as a test-bed for the collection and analysis of data from the driving 
platform.  The driving simulation allows subjects to drive in a rich simulated environment 
with realistic scenery, other cars, and pedestrians.  Following a format similar to a 
previous study in our lab (Jovancevic, Sullivan and Hayhoe 2006) subjects drove in two 
conditions, one in which they were instructed to drive in a self-paced manner and a 
second where they were instructed to follow a lead car.  Although subjects are not 
directly rewarded in these tasks, it is assumed that experimenter instruction acts as an 
implicit reward structure for the subject.  In both conditions the configuration of other 
cars driving on the road was fixed leading to very similar visual experiences, however we 
wished to explore the effect of task instructions on the distribution of fixations in order to 
develop a viable paradigm for testing the Sprague & Ballard model. 
 
DRIVING PLATFORM OVERVIEW 
The driving platform consists of a stripped-down car cab interior with a seat, 
steering wheel, brake, and gas pedal (See Figure 2).  While, the platform has the 
capability to move via a set of hydraulics, all experiments were conducted without 
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motion due to concerns about inducing motion sickness due to hardware and software 
latencies.  The driving platform also features a clutch and directional signals but subjects 
were instructed not to use them and the car in the simulation had an automatic 
transmission that required no interaction from the driver other than using the gas pedal.  
The wheel and pedals are connected to an analog to digital converter that allows real-time 
positional measurement for control of driving simulation software.  Additionally, a 
transducer speaker is mounted onto the car seat to provide a vibration and sound that is 
proportional to the activity of the engine in the virtual environment. 
To view the driving environment, subjects wore a Virtual Research V8 head 
mounted display (HMD) with a 640x480 resolution refreshed at 60hz with a 60° diagonal 
field of view with full binocular overlap.  Subjects’ head movements, 6 degrees of 
freedom for spatial position and orientation, were recorded by a Polhemus FasTrak 
positional tracking system mounted onto the HMD.  The HMD display was rendered by 
in-house software running on an Intel Core2 Windows XP based system using 
OpenSceneGraph 2.0.  
Mounted on the HMD is an Applied Science Labs Eye-Trac6 bright pupil video 
eye tracking system.  The eye tracker uses a camera mounted on the HMD exterior that is 
aimed at an infrared reflective mirror placed in front of the left eye of the HMD’s optics.  
The system sampled eye position at 60hz and in ideal conditions can track with a 
precision and accuracy of ~1°.  Subjects were calibrated to a nine-point grid at the 
beginning of each trial and the calibration was checked at the end of each trial to allow 
subsequent error measurements. 
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Figure 2: Depiction of the Driving Simulator  
(Left) External view of the driving platform. (Right) Internal view from a subject’s point 
of view in the simulator (subject’s were presented with stereo image pairs). The white 
crosshair represents the subject’s point of gaze 
 
Once a subject was wearing the HMD and calibrated for the eye tracker, the HMD 
would display the driving environment.  From the driver’s perspective they were inside a 
car with a dashboard, steering wheel etc., see Figure 2.  Note the car interior was not 
animated so the steering wheel and various dashboard readouts were merely static objects 
rendered in the 3-D world.  Additionally, the car interior lacked rearview, driver and 
passenger-side mirrors.   
The virtual car that subjects drove is modeled by the Vortex physics software 
engine by CM Labs.  This software API allows the simulation of forces on 3-D objects 
and simulates the transmission of a car, including gear ratios and revolutions per minute 
levels for shifting gears.  The virtual environment was generated via the Tile 
Management Tool software package created by researchers at the University of Iowa’s 
National Advanced Driving Simulator. The path driven was a continuous four-lane road 
in an urban setting without traffic signs or signals or any intersections.  The driving path 
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contained many static objects including buildings, plants, cars parked on the side of the 
road, and pedestrians on the sidewalk.   The path was approximately 2km long and 
subjects drove its entirety in one direction in about two minutes at ~30 m/s. 
To increase the realism of the driving environment several dynamic object models 
were added. Using two car models, a truck and a sedan, eight oncoming cars and nine 
outgoing (i.e. cars traveling in the same direction as the subject) were added to the 
environment.  Additionally, there was a single red sports car in the environment that 
acted as either another outgoing car or as the leader car depending on the condition.  
These cars were spaced out roughly uniformly throughout the subject’s driving path and 
followed unique non-intersecting paths whose trajectories were captured from the paths 
of a human driver.   Using the DI-Guy character animation software (Boston Dynamics) 
seven pedestrians were placed in set of locations on sidewalks along the path nearly 
equally spaced at ~250m.  When a subject’s car position was within 150m of a given 
pedestrian, the simulation software began a probabilistic ‘dice-roll’ every frame at 
success rate of 10% to initiate the onset of the pedestrian walking from their initial 
location to a new location on the sidewalk on the opposite side of the street. 
Because the driving environment is simulated, experiments can be conducted 
across subjects with identical routes and car paths allowing gross level control of the 
visual stimuli they observe. However, since subjects are in control of the exact speed and 
course of the drive, each has a unique visual experience and trajectory despite these 
efforts to minimize this variance. 
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METHOD 
Nine University of Texas undergraduate students (7 males, 2 females, 21 years 
mean age, 1.4 SD) gave informed consent and participated in the experiment receiving 
either monetary compensation or course credit for their assistance.  Five other 
participants were run but could not be analyzed due to poor eye tracking or data file 
errors, one additional subject was run but did not go beyond practice trials due to motion 
sickness.  All subjects had normal or corrected to normal vision via contact lenses.  All 
subjects were asked to fill out a short questionnaire detailing their driving history, 
including number of years of experience, driving frequency and duration per week.  
Subjects reported a mean of 5 years driving experience (1.8 SD), driving a mean number 
of 3.5 times per week (0.9 SD) for a total of 4.4 hours per week (1.9 SD). 
While we strived to make the car simulation realistic, there is a certain amount of 
learning that needs to occur to adapt to the car’s dynamics and wearing the HMD. To 
ensure that participants were familiar with these driving dynamics in the simulation, all 
participants were given a practice period to drive the entire length of the driving course at 
least two and up to four times depending on their level of driving comfort. During the 
practice sessions the dynamic objects in the environment, oncoming and outgoing cars 
and walking pedestrians, were absent. Subjects were encouraged to try hard turns, 
accelerations and braking to make sure they were completely familiar with how the car 
responded. 
Once subjects confirmed that they were comfortable driving the car, they 
performed two conditions whose order was counterbalanced across subjects.  In both 
conditions subjects were read a standardized script. In the Self-Paced Condition, subjects 
were told to drive at a pace that they felt matched the flow of traffic in the environment.  
Since there are no speed limit signs or a speedometer in the car, subjects were asked to 
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drive at a pace that seemed reasonable for a busy urban environment.  Additionally, 
subjects were reminded to avoid collisions with other cars and pedestrians and to drive in 
a lawful manner.  Subjects were instructed to wait for a red sports car to pass by them and 
to begin driving once the car appeared onscreen. In the Leader Condition, subjects were 
given the same instructions as above but in addition they were told that they should 
follow the red sports car while driving and attempt to stay in the same lane as the leader 
while following at approximately 2-3 car lengths behind. 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
During the experiment a data file was generated that contained readings from the 
car controls (steering and pedals), positions of the subject’s head and eye as well as the 
positions of all of the objects in the environment. Additionally, a mini-DV recorder 
captured the live video output of the subject’s first person viewpoint with a crosshair 
overlaid, indicating the location of the center of vision for the left eye on each frame.  
Due to the laborious nature of frame-by-frame video coding, only three subjects’ videos 
were coded manually.  Saccades and fixations were noted and provided with a label for 
the objects that appeared near (~1deg) fixation.  In some cases the content of the fixation 
could change due to dynamics in the world (e.g. looking at a static object and another car 
drives into and occludes that position) or when saccades are missed due to difficulties in 
visual inspection. In such events the fixation ended if the object near fixation changed 
significantly.  The coding process was performed by two trained observers who coded the 
data into fixations on semantic categories including: the Road, Oncoming Cars, Outgoing 
Cars (including sub categories for the car directly In Front of the driver and other cars 
Far Ahead and not directly in front), Static Cars on the roadside, Pedestrians (either 
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Moving across the road, or Static on the road side or in the road), Buildings, and a catch 
all ‘Other’ category for any fixations on sky and landscape elements not contained in the 
above. 
The data from these subjects were used as the ground truth for the development 
and testing of an automated gaze analysis tool developed in our lab.  By using the head 
orientation and position of the subject along with the positions of all the objects in the 
driving environment our analysis tool can create a complete reconstruction of the 
experimental environment.  Each data frame is analyzed for the types of objects present 
in the local area near fixation.  Given the reconstruction, we use the projection of the eye 
position in 2-D to query the pixels in a local area (13x13 pixels, ~1x1deg) for the identity 
of the object present in that pixel, taking the most frequent object category label as the 
fixation label.  Due to technical limitations in this labeling step, the automated data can 
only provide object labels for: Oncoming Cars, Outgoing Cars, and Pedestrians. All 
other fixations on the road or scenery are entered into the Other category.   
Eye movement data were initially segmented in two ways, segmentation via 
object labels and using the eye velocity signal with an adaptive velocity threshold 
algorithm (Rothkopf and Pelz 2004). Both approaches have limitations, object label 
segmentation examines the data for sets of continuous object labels near the point of gaze 
that last at least 2 frames. A 10x10 window was used around fixation which translates to 
roughly .75°x.75°. It is subject to noise in the eye position signal if it is near the border of 
object classes and does not reveal fixations within an object category (i.e. the label never 
changes) and thus can only determine looks, the beginning and ending a fixation or set of 
fixations on a distinct object class.  The velocity analysis does not use label knowledge 
but is also subject to noise in the eye gaze signal.  The velocity analysis marks fixations 
by looking for frame sequences of at least 50ms in length where the eye velocity is below 
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35deg/s (although this parameter can change on the local noise level in a local window).  
After these segments have been found the object labels for a given segment are counted 
and the fixation is labeled with the most frequent label. Due to the dynamic nature of the 
world eye position can remain relatively stable but the content of fixation can change. For 
example the velocity segmentation may report a fixation of 1.5 seconds in length but that 
fixation could actually have 1s of labels for one object and 500ms for another due to 
objects moving in and out of the fixation window.  While there are many ways to deal 
with this segmentation and labeling problem, I chose to categorize looks via the label 
segmentation method due to the simplicity of its assumptions, i.e. the content in the 
fixation labeling window is of primary importance. However, since this method can be 
misleading to labeling noise (e.g. breaking up a look into multiple smaller ones due to 
label variation caused by a poor track), I largely focused on measures of look duration 
where problems with look counts can be avoided. I do present some data on look 
transition probabilities and this issue should be kept in mind when interpreting these data. 
Lastly, in the automated analysis each frame was analyzed in a similar pixel-wise 
fashion to determine onscreen content, allowing a frame-by-frame description of 
presence or absence of objects onscreen as well as their the visual size and position in the 
world.  
Due to the complexity of the data set, there are many possible analyses and 
comparisons that can be made on each object class, including total proportion of look 
duration, look number, look duration, look latencies, scan path descriptions and look 
transition probabilities.  For simplicity’s sake and the intent of focusing on task-related 
differences, the data analysis presented here focuses primarily on effects in gaze 
distribution. Below, I present manually coded data for five subjects as well as automated 
labeling data for the entire set of nine subjects. 
 54 
RESULTS 
Basic Driving Measures  
In the self-paced condition, drivers took an average of 136s (SEM: 8.5s) to 
complete a driving session and in the leader condition it took 125s (SEM: 3.6).  Mean 
velocities reflected this trend where drivers in the self-paced condition drove at a mean of 
13.8 m/s (SEM 3.6), and drivers in the Leader condition drove at 14.9 m/s (SEM 1.4).  In 
the self-paced condition, other cars, pedestrians, and the leader car were onscreen an 
average of 27s, 21s, and 69s respectively.  In the Leader condition the numbers for the 
same categories were 23s, 19s, and 112s. Subject driving performance was overall quite 
good, collisions with cars did not occur and only one subject collided a single time with a 
pedestrian.   
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Figure 3: Manually coded gaze proportion data. 
Each subject’s fixation history was taken and durations for each object category were 
summed.  Gaze duration was normalized for each subject by dividing total summed 
fixation durations across object categories.  Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM 
 
Hand Coded Fixation Data  
Manually coded data were used to provide ground truth for comparison against 
subsequent automated analysis.  Additionally, since human coders have greater options in 
applying semantic labels it could also reveal limitations in our automated analysis. The 
following results are only a qualitative analysis since the main goal was to compare the 
outcome of manual versus automated coding. Figure 3 presents the proportion of summed 
fixation durations normalized by total driving time.  For ease of visualization, the 
fixations on the road, static cars and pedestrians and scenery/buildings are collapsed into 
the Other category. Roughly 95% of fixations in the Other category were on the road. 
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Subjects in the self-paced condition showed a clear trend to predominantly fixate other 
objects (mostly the road) and outgoing cars, and the leader car and pedestrians to a lesser 
extent.  Subjects in the leader condition predominantly fixated the Leader and Other 
category, with Outgoing cars and pedestrians fixated to a lesser extent.  These trends still 
hold even if summed fixations are normalized by the onscreen time of objects instead of 
drive time.  These preliminary results suggest that when following, subjects’ tend to 
substitute looks at the road and outgoing cars with looks at the following car instead due 
to its higher task priority. 
One-step Markov transition probabilities were computed for fixations on object-
categories (similar to Underwood et al 2003) as shown in Figure 4.  In the self-paced 
condition subjects tend to transition most frequently to the road and outgoing cars 
second-most, in the leader condition the most probable transitions are first to the leader 
and then to the road again indicating a shift in gaze priority.   
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Figure 4: Fixation transition matrices for the two driving conditions.   
(Top) Transitions in the Follow Condition (Bottom) Transitions ion the Self-Paced 
Condition. The horizontal axis represents the object category of the current fixation. The 
vertical axis represents the object category the fixation will transition to next. Circular 
markers represent the transition probability. Note the largest circles represents ~65% 
probability.  
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Figure 5: Mean fixation duration data from manual-coding analysis.  
There were no differences found in fixation durations.  Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM. 
Percentages are only for subjects’ first trials.  
 
Lastly, fixation durations were calculated for object categories, as shown in 
Figure 5. It is possible that a following task might increase fixation durations on the 
leader and decrease durations on other objects, however no reliable differences were 
found between conditions.  
Automated Analysis 
I’ll now turn to the automated analysis to provide a more comprehensive 
description of the subjects’ performance.  Figure 6 shows a graph identical in format to 
Figure 3, but with values computed via the automated analysis software.  Ordinal 
relationships for oncoming cars, outgoing cars and pedestrian are quite similar in both 
types of analysis. However, because the fixation window used is quite small this results 
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in more conservative estimates compared to the human coders. The primary difference 
between types of analysis is that the Other category has an increased frequency of 
fixations and the frequency for leader fixations is decreased.  There are inherent problems 
with manual coding, e.g. inter-rater reliability with manual coding and difficulty 
identifying fixations on small objects due to eye tracking video quality limitations. Given 
the similarity between the coding schemes and the inherent problems of human coding, I 
will henceforth only consider the automated analysis. 
The greater data set available also highlighted an unexpected learning effect due 
to counterbalancing conditions.  Subjects that drove in the self-paced condition after 
following a leader had nearly identical proportion of fixations on the leader in both 
conditions suggesting that they were still primed for following (two-tailed t-test, df=5, 
t=0.12, p=0.91).  Given that following the leader change subjects’ subsequent driving 
fixation strategies when driving self-paced, only the results from subjects’ first driving 
trial are presented.   Unfortunately, due to data file problems with participant data on this 
initial trial, the data set was reduced to seven participants (four in the leader condition 
and three in the self-paced condition).  Analysis of fixation proportion controlled for 
onscreen time (Figure 6) revealed that in this reduced set, there was an effect of task 
where subjects in the leader condition increased the proportion of fixations on the leader 
(42% vs. 8%) and decreased this proportion on outgoing cars (6% vs. 11%) and the other 
category (59% vs. 24%), with the statistics respectively, Leader: two-tailed t-test, 
t(5)=2.61, p=0.047; Outgoing: t(5)=2.87, p=0.0351; Other: t(5)=4.91, p=0.005. In 
Experiment 1, subjects were instructed to either follow a car or drive in a self-paced 
manner.   
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Figure 6: Fixation data via automated analysis.  
Summed gaze duration’s are normalized by onscreen time of each object category per 
subject.  Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM. Percentages are only for subjects’ first trials. 
Significant differences (p<0.05) are present in the leader, outgoing car, and other 
categories 
 
DISCUSSION 
This experiment showed in both manual and automated analyses a reliable task-
based difference in gaze strategy due to these tasks demands.  While there are several 
analyses that could be done more thoroughly, the goals for this experiment were simply 
to develop a driving environment and experimental protocol for data collection and 
analysis, as well as an automated gaze labeling system. While there were several 
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problems with either successful eye tracking or data file errors, and a disruption of within 
subjects analysis due to this, these issues will all be addressed in Experiment 2. Secondly, 
a task effect on gaze distribution was demonstrated via the experimental 
instruction/reward manipulation. The leader task absorbs a large proportion of gaze time 
that is normally distributed elsewhere in the environment.  
While Experiment 1 was successful in its limited aims, there are several problems 
that are addressed in Experiment 2 including improved experimental procedures, 
conditions and analysis.  Additionally, a core element of testing the Sprague and Ballard 
model is to observe to what degree human gaze behavior reflects sensitivity to not only 
reward but also uncertainty, which was not addressed in this Experiment 1 but will be the 
focus of Experiment 2.  
Let’s consider some of the core problems with Experiment 1. A task effect was 
found between driving self-paced and while car following, but these tasks had radically 
different visual experiences.  Despite the fact that a task effect exists when onscreen time 
is controlled for, it is worth noting that subjects in the self-paced condition had the leader 
car onscreen roughly 50% less than subjects in the leader task condition.  This asymmetry 
yields problems with our experimental manipulation of task/reward and complicates 
applications to a modular description in the scheduling model. A more sensible design 
would simultaneously pit tasks against each other, allowing each task a constant 
opportunity to be executed by the driver. For instance, in the self-paced condition the lead 
car would often go completely off-screen preventing the driver from direct sensory access 
to that task.  If subjects were given the same set of tasks but their relative emphasis was 
manipulated this would avoid complete deprioritzation of a task (e.g. not following the 
leader at all) and ensure a base level task-based gaze switching.  Additionally, these 
changes make the introduction of uncertainty easier as it can be assumed that the of set 
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tasks are constantly available to the driver and that uncertainty isn’t caused due to the fact 
the visual information is unavailable.  
Another problem was that subjects appeared to incorporate instructions from 
previous trials into their current trial. All subjects were read a standard instructional 
paragraph before starting each trial, but apparently these instructions did not emphasize 
compliance with the task sufficiently for this effect to be overcome.  Similarly in the 
practice driving session, subjects were not informed about their subsequent experimental 
objectives which overall led to a lax atmosphere for task compliance.  These two 
problems are addressed in Experiment 2 by providing more emphasis on task goals and 
more explicit instruction in the practice sessions about experimental conditions so that 
subjects understood that they were expected to drive at a high level of performance. 
Another problem was introduced by the presence of pedestrians, because they 
walked across the street in front of the driver.  Although not discussed above, some 
drivers were more likely to stop for a pedestrian than others and this lead to disruptions in 
the following task and added an extra element of complexity that is not necessary for 
Experiment 2’s focus on uncertainty and reward. 
Lastly, while the automated analysis and manual coding had similar results, 
manual coding has several advantages that can be incorporated into the automated 
analysis.  Manual coding provided multiple gaze labels and was undoubtedly more 
forgiving if the eye tracker’s position was slightly off of an object category. To address 
this, Experiment 2 incorporates smoothing of the eye-tracking signal, a larger region of 
interest around fixation and the use of multiple object labels instead of a single tag. 
All of these problems were addressed in Experiment 2, as well as more in depth 
analyses and a more logical experimental setup that allows us to answer whether or not 
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humans incorporate reward and uncertainty estimates in their gaze allocation while 
engaged in a natural task. 
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7. Experiment 2 - Reward & Uncertainty effects in driving 
 
MOTIVATION 
In Experiment 1, the task manipulation of instructing subjects to follow a car was 
considered an implicit change in subject’s relative task reward valuations.  The 
scheduling model uses both uncertainty and reward estimates to allocate fixations.  A 
direct test requires an experiment that manipulates both variables to observe an outcome 
in human behavior and compare against model predictions. Sprague (2005) presented 
preliminary human gaze data from one subject in this type of situation where the subjects 
monitored two visual sources of information, one a falling bar that had to reach a certain 
height and the other a pair of bars that intermittently spread apart, for a ‘go’ signal that 
meant they should press a button. The visual sources could be manipulated such that each 
could have lesser or greater variance in their visual appearance and lesser or greater 
reward associated with a correct button press. Sprague’s work suggested that human 
observers are sensitive to these manipulations in a manner consistent with the scheduling 
model. However, this work had only a single subject and this manipulation was not 
explored in more natural contexts. Experiment 2 takes this prior study’s concepts and 
applies it to the driving context from our previous experiment. 
The module framework and the nature of the human driving data provide a limit 
on experimentally viable sources of reward and/or uncertainty to introduce in the driving 
environment.  Pedestrians and other vehicles (other than the lead car) are individually 
present for rather brief periods and this limits the number of fixations subjects might 
make and thus the amount of time available to evaluate uncertainty. The difficulty or 
visibility of a road could be altered to introduce uncertainty but could also alter 
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navigation speeds (Senders 1983), potentially leaving gaze strategies intact as subjects 
can self-regulate the amount of new information becoming available.  In Experiment 1, 
drivers were told to drive in a self-paced fashion, however it is possible to more directly 
control subject behavior by imposing a speed task. An overt fixation on a speedometer 
makes modeling the speed following task a tractable module to be implemented in the 
Sprague & Ballard model. While there are many possible avenues for introduction of 
uncertainty, it was decided that by incorporating a speed following task and in some 
conditions adding noise to the car velocity would serve to be the most convenient and 
effective way to satisfy our goals to experimentally manipulate reward and uncertainty.  
Our graphics environment was altered to render a speedometer that gave subjects 
a constant analog readout of their speed.  This speedometer could give noisy readings that 
fluctuate around a mean, adding uncertainty to subject’s speed estimates and potentially 
increasing fixations if subjects adhere to a speed limit. Note, while it is possible to affect 
the speedometer reading only, we decided to introduce noise into the car’s gas pedal 
signal.  This was chosen because of the difficulty drivers in pilot studies experienced 
when the speedometer’s gauge visually fluctuated but did not influence the car’s 
behavior. One could argue that subjects could be given instructions to ignore this 
discrepancy as introducing velocity noise could have interference effects with a 
simultaneous leader following task. Additionally, noise presence might encourage 
subjects to simply stop using the speedometer and just rely on optic flow.  Although these 
are valid objections, thorough pilot testing and our subsequent results with the final 
experimental setup demonstrate that these do not appear to be major issues influencing 
human gaze behavior.  However, it is worth noting that our assumption of the 
independence of action output (gas pedal presses) for the leader following task and speed 
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following task did ultimately lead to problems in parameter fitting our model to the 
human data, which will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
In our experimental method, subjects were instructed to follow a leader car and 
follow a constant speed with varying priorities dependent on task instruction; these 
conditions are elaborated on in more detail below. Before these details, let us first 
consider the predicted ordinal results from the scheduling model using different 
combinations of reward and uncertainty in these two tasks. A quantitative treatment of 
these predictions follows in the next chapter, but for now let us simply think of the model 
as multiplying uncertainty and reward together to yield a gaze priority metric. Table 1 
presents such predictions of human gaze behavior on the car’s speedometer.   
 
Experimental 
Condition 
Reward Uncertainty 
Speedometer 
Fixation 
Proportion 
Leader Low Low Low 
Leader + Noise Low High Intermediate 
Speed Low High Intermediate 
Speed + Noise High High High 
Table 1: Ordinal predictions for fixation proportion on the speedometer.  
A qualitative prediction for the proportion of fixations devoted to the speedometer 
dependent on the combination of possible reward and uncertainties assuming subjects 
use uncertainty weighted reward calculations as in the Sprague and Ballard scheduler 
model.  
 
To summarize, if participants do incorporate uncertainty and reward estimates into gaze 
allocation it is expected that there will be a gain boosting effect of both uncertainty. 
Additionally, it is possible there may be an interaction such that subjects devote a large 
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proportion of fixations to an uncertain task only if it has sufficient reward associated with 
it. 
 
METHOD  
The same driving platform was used in Experiment 2. However, during the period 
between Experiments 1 and 2, several equipment changes occurred, including switching 
to a new HMD, a NVIS nVisor SX111 with 90° diagonal field of view, 1280x1024 
resolution updated at 60hz and using a new eye-tracking unit in the helmet, an Arrington 
Research ViewPoint EyeTracker, a dark pupil system with 60hz sampling.  From in-
house testing the eye tracker has similar levels of accuracy and precision as the prior ASL 
system of ~1° in scenarios with good tracks. Additionally, all video records were saved in 
directly to a hard drive in digital format. As with the prior experiment a Polhemus 
FasTrak system was used to track head movements at 60hz.will be used for the study as 
described in the Method section for Experiment 1.   
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Figure 7: Example of the new experimental setup from Experiment 2. 
In the top left an image is embedded over the scene actually viewed by the driver. The 
rest of the image shows an example frame where the subject is fixating the speedometer. 
 
The car interior was adjusted so that the speedometer gave a live update of the 
subject’s velocity in the driving environment (see Figure 7). When uncertainty was 
introduced, uniform noise was added to the car’s gas pedal command. The Vortex 
software simulation uses a value from 0 to 1 to indicated the degree to which the gas 
pedal is depressed.  When the subject achieved a velocity above 10 m/s the software 
would then add a randomly chosen value between 0 and 0.5 every 200ms to the car’s gas 
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command.  This resulted in driving a car that appeared to have a mechanical problem that 
made it quite challenging to maintain a constant speed. Although this type of noise is 
dependent on the subject’s current speed, when the gas pedal was held constant the 
speedometer representation in the car would typically vary between +/- 0 to 5 mph with 
some occasional swings as large +/-10 mph. 
Subjects were read a set of standardized instructions that told them to drive in a 
lawful manner in an urban setting, additionally, depending on the condition they were 
told that their main priority in driving was either the Leader Task, following a lead car at 
a distance of two car lengths, or the Speed Task, maintaining a constant speed of 40mph. 
They were also informed that a second task, either the Lead Task or the Speed Task, 
whichever was not emphasized, should also be done but was less important. The subjects’ 
primary goal was always reiterated to them before they initiated driving. Subjects were 
run in four conditions in a blocked counter balanced order. Subjects did their first block 
with two trials of one task type followed by another block of the alternate task. Within 
each block the order trials with or without noise presence were balanced. In the second 
block the subjects performed the opposite task emphasis trials again with noise presence 
balanced. Each condition varied task emphasis and the presence or absence of noise 
resulting in a 2x2 design. Subjects were not informed about the presence or absence of 
noise in the gas pedal signal. Prior to the experiment starting all subjects were given two 
practice runs in the environment for ~5 minutes where other cars were absent and noise 
was absent. 
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RESULTS  
34 undergraduate participants with normal or corrected to normal vision from the 
University of Texas at Austin took part in the experiment. 10 subjects’ data were not used 
because they could not complete all 4 conditions either due to motion sickness or a poor 
eye tracking signal. Of the remaining 24 subjects, 8 additional subjects’ data were not 
considered further in the full analysis due to infrequent checking of the speedometer in 
any one condition. We used a criterion to exclude subjects who made less than 7 fixations 
on the speedometer, as each driving condition was 98s duration on average and the 
overall mean number of fixations on the speedometer across all conditions was 34 (13.5 
SD). While all subjects were able to complete the conditions adequately, these subjects 
were possibly using a different strategy for measuring speed (e.g. optic flow) rather than 
directly foveating the speedometer, making their behavior difficult to compare to the 
other subjects. This yielded a set of data from 16 subjects for our analysis. Of these 16, 
there were 9 males and 7 females with a mean age of 19.6 years (2.6 SD), with a mean of 
3.8 years driving experience (2 SD). Additionally, to avoid the inclusion of fixation 
behavior at the end and beginning of each trial when subjects often were not actively 
driving or weren’t in position with other cars, all data files were segmented to only 
include the portion where vehicle velocity close was above 15 m/s.  Note, in the data and 
figures below the terms uncertainty and noise are used interchangeably to describe the 
presence of the uniform noise added to the subject’s car velocity. 
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Figure 8: Mean distance and standard deviation in distance to leader for each subject 
across conditions.  
(Top) Distance to Leader. (Bottom) Standard Deviation of Leader Distance. There was a 
main effect of noise on leader distance and a marginally significant interaction between 
task and noise.  S.D. of leader distance was significantly affected by noise. Error bars 
represent +/-1 SEM. 
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Driving Behavior 
First we’ll consider subject driving performance.  This will allow us to quantify 
how our instructions shaped behavior and how the presence or absence of noise affected 
car navigation. 
Subjects all had similar task compliance but there were some key differences due 
to our experimental manipulations.  The top of Figure 8 shows between subjects’ means 
across groups for their average distance to the leader.  Note that for this and all 
subsequent analyses in this section, the graphs display between subjects averages, but all 
analyses were within subjects. For ease of comparison with the figures, I will present 
means calculated from the between subjects comparison. A 2-way repeated measures 
ANOVA (Noise Absence/Presence vs. Speed/Follow Task) on subject velocity showed 
that there was no main effect of task on mean leader distance, Leader Task=24.2m vs. 
Speed Task=24m, (F(15,1)=0.02, p=.89). However, there was a main effect of noise 
where subjects were ~5m further behind the leader, No Noise=21.6m vs. With Noise 
26.6m, (F(15,1)=21.7, 0.0003) and a marginally significant interaction (F(15,1)=3.44, 
p=0.08).  
Another metric to measure performance is how much drivers varied in 
maintaining a distance behind the leader. The bottom of Figure 8 shows this. There was a 
marginal (at best) effect of task on mean standard deviation of leader distance, Leader 
Task=5.6m vs. Speed Task=6.5m, (F(15,1)=2.6, p=.12). Suggesting that subjects in the 
Speed Task may be slightly worse at following. There was also strong main effect of 
noise, No Noise=4.2m vs. With Noise=7.8m, (F(15,1)=31.3, p<.0001) with no significant 
interaction (F(15,1)=1.12, p=0.31). Subjects driving with noise are further behind and 
have greater variation in the distance they follow at. 
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The same sets of analyses above were done on car velocity. The top of Figure 9 
shows a graph of velocities across subjects. A 2-way repeated measures ANOVA found 
no main effect of task on mean car velocity, Leader Task=16.97m/s vs. Speed 
Task=17.1m/s, (F(15,1)=6.5, p=.02). However, there was a main effect of noise, which is 
not surprising, No Noise=17.1m/s vs. With Noise=16.97m/s, (F(15,1)=5.4, 0.03) and a 
marginally significant interaction (F(15,1)=3.44, p=0.08). 
We also looked at the variation in performance for maintaining a constant speed 
(See Figure 9 bottom).  There was a marginally significant main effect of task on mean 
standard deviation on car velocity with subjects in the Speed Task tending to have 
slightly less variance, Leader Task=2.3m/s vs. Speed Task=2.2m/s,  (F(15,1)=3.9, p=.07). 
There was also a main effect of noise, as expected, No Noise =1.7m/s vs. With 
Noise=2.8m/s (F(15,1)=138, p=<.001) with no significant interaction (F(15,1)=.24, 
p=0.62).  
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Figure 9: Mean car velocity and Standard Deviation of Velocity for each subject across 
the set of driving conditions.  
(Top) Mean Velocity. There was a main effect of noise on velocity and a marginally 
significant interaction between task and noise presence.   (Bottom) Standard deviation of 
velocity. There was a main effect of task and noise on the S.D of velocity. Error bars 
represent +/-1 SEM. 
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Overall, subjects driving behavior falls in line with our manipulations. Cueing a task 
tends to improve performance in that task.  However, the introduction of velocity noise 
disrupts that performance regardless of task. Given these results, there is a potential 
problem with our manipulation that could lead one to argue that the velocity noise makes 
both the Speed Task and Leader Task more difficult. As such, one might expect eye 
movements to compensate in both conditions so that subjects would need to look at both 
the leader and speedometer more frequently when noise is present, regardless of task.  
However, the gaze data below demonstrate that while driving performance is disrupted in 
both tasks by the introduction of noise, there are strong effects of both task and noise on 
gaze that counter this argument. 
 
Gaze behavior 
As in Experiment 1, subjects’ eye position data were analyzed using an automated 
system.  The eye signal was preprocessed using a median filter and a moving average 
over three frames to smooth the signal.  A 60x60 pixel window, ~2°x2° of visual angle, 
was centered around the location of the point of gaze on each frame and each pixel in the 
window returned a label for the type of object it contained. Subject’s eye position was 
measured against a calibration screen at the beginning and end of each trial.   
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Figure 10: Example of look behavior from a single driving trial where the speed 
following was emphasized. 
The horizontal axis displays time in seconds and the vertical corresponds to object 
category.  Each rectangular chunk corresponds to a portion of time where the eye was 
within ~2° of an object class: Red=Leader Car, Dark Blue=Outgoing Cars, Light 
Blue=Speedometer, Green=Oncoming Cars, Cyan=Other. 
 
Subject’s included in the analysis had a precision of ~1-2° and global offsets were 
applied as needed to each subject’s data if we need to ensure that the point of gaze signal 
was correctly lined up with the calibration targets.  Looks of less than 100ms duration 
were not included in our analysis. 
Eye data were segmented by object label’s, as in Experiment 1, however to allow 
a more liberal description of the image content near the fovea, all labels were considered 
in our analysis and not just the label associated with majority of pixels in the 60x60 
window. Also, to have a look labeled as being on the ‘other’ category all of the pixels had 
to be labeled as ‘other.’  Figure 10 shows an example of the type of segmented data 
yielded from this analysis for a single trial where the speed following task was 
emphasized.  
20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Fi
xF
ind
er
20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Se
gf
ix
20 40 60 80 100 120
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Time (s)
Ob
jec
t I
D 
Nu
m
be
r
 77 
Look proportions on the speedometer and leader were analyzed for ordering 
effects, which we saw in Experiment 1 and wished to avoid with our new setup.  
ANOVAs were conducted comparing fixation distributions per condition across groups 
of subjects who drove in the same condition order. Marginal effects of condition order 
were found on speedometer look proportions in the Leader Task, F(3,12)=2.97, p=0.08, 
and on leader look proportions also in the same task, F(3,12)=2.94, p=0.08. Further 
inspection found for subjects who performed trials in the order, [Leader+Noise, Leader, 
Speed+Noise, Speed], there was a tendency in the Leader Task to look more frequently at 
the speedometer and less so at the leader than other trial orderings.  It is not entirely clear 
what this trend means and how order effects might contribute to the data we collected. 
However, due to the ANOVA results, we proceeded with our analysis assuming that 
ordering effects were not prominent. 
 
Fixation Proportion  
There are several metrics available to capture how subject gaze behavior varies in 
each condition. One basic metric is the proportion of time spent looking at the various 
object categories in the driving world as shown in Figure 11. Note that proportions in this 
figure do not sum to one since looks can contain multiple labels across object classes.    
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Figure 11: Mean percentage of looks across object categories. 
Looks proportions are calculated for each category and controlled for amount of time 
present onscreen and then averaged across subjects.  Error bars show +/-1 SEM. 
 
This figure shows, similar to Experiment 1, much of the subjects’ time driving is spent 
looking at the leader car and other cars.  Note that due to the new method of look labeling 
in Experiment 2, this downplays the amount of information coming from the road. In 
nearly all fixations, except those on the speedometer and some rare cases (e.g. looking at 
the sky), the eye is in a position to gather information about the road.  However, because 
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we cannot explicitly label the road in our analysis and do not have any specific 
hypotheses concerning looks to the road or to a specific part of the road these types of 
fixations will not be addressed. Most important for our manipulation are the differences 
between looks to the leader car and the speedometer, which I address in more depth 
below. 
  Now I will address the differences in look proportions for our experimentally 
relevant object categories: looks at the leader car and the speedometer.  The top of Figure 
12 shows the mean gaze behavior on the leader across conditions.  There was a main 
effect of task on the mean fixation proportion of leader looks, 84% vs. 63%, ANOVA 
F(15,1)=34.5, p<0.0001, and a trend for noise presence, 76%s vs. 71%s, ANOVA 
F(15,1)=4 p=0.064. There was also a significant interaction between these variables, 
ANOVA F(15,1)=Inf, p<.0001. Paired-sample t-tests were conducted and no effect of 
speed noise in the Follow Task condition (84%) versus the Follow Task+Noise condition 
(84%) was found, t(30)=0.38, p=0.71.   
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Figure 12: Mean look proportions to the leader car and speedometer. 
(Top) Proportion of looks to the lead car in both tasks, with and without noise added. 
(Bottom) Proportion of looks to the speedometer in both tasks, with and without noise 
added. Error bars show +/-1 SEM. 
 
However, there was an effect of speed noise presence in the Speed Task (68% vs. 58%), 
t(30)=3.59, p=.0027. On average subjects decreased look proportions on the leader by 
~10% when the speed condition was emphasized and noise was present. This result 
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suggests that subjects are using uncertainty information but only in the condition where 
the speedometer’s task based reward is high. 
 The bottom half of Figure 12 summarizes the same type of data for looks to the 
speedometer. There was a main effect of task on the mean proportion of speedometer 
looks, 10% vs. 29%, ANOVA F(15,1)=56, p<.0.0001, and of noise presence, 17% vs. 
23%, ANOVA F(15,1)=Inf, p<0.0001. There was also significant interaction between 
these variables, ANOVA F(15,1)=Inf, p<.0001. Paired-sample t-tests were conducted and 
a again it was found that there was no effect of speed noise in the follow condition (10%) 
versus the follow with noise condition (11%), t(30)=.32, p=0.75.  However, there was an 
effect of speed noise for in the speed task (24% vs. 34%), t(30)=4.8, p=0.0002. On 
average, subjects increased look proportions on the speedometer by ~10% in the Speed 
Task when noise was present.  This data suggests that when subjects are in the Speed 
Task+Noise, the extra proportion of look durations they devote towards the speedometer 
is subtracted from leader task. 
 
Number of Looks 
Another metric to gauge visual behavior is the number of looks devoted to an 
object category. Figure 13 shows the number of looks at either the leader or the 
speedometer were measured and examined for effects of task and noise presence.  
First we’ll consider mean number of looks to the leader. There was a main effect 
of task on the mean number of leader looks, 31.8 vs. 47.3, ANOVA F(15,1)=15.42, 
p=0.001, but no effect of noise, 39.3 vs. 39.9, ANOVA F(15,1)=0.08, p=0.78 and no 
significant interaction between these variables, ANOVA F(15,1)=0.2, p=0.66.  In general,  
 
 82 
Figure 13: Mean number of looks to the Leader Car and Speedometer. 
(Top) Average number of looks to the lead car in both tasks, with and without noise 
added. (Bottom) Average number of looks to the speedometer in both tasks, with and 
without noise added. Error bars show +/-1 SEM. 
 
subjects make more (but much shorter duration, see below) looks towards the leader in 
the Speed Task regardless of noise. 
The bottom of Figure 13 summarizes mean number of looks to the speedometer. 
There was a main effect of task on the mean number of speedometer looks, 25.1 vs. 40.2, 
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ANOVA F(15,1)=20.83, p=0.0003, and a trend for of noise, 30.7 vs. 34.6, ANOVA 
F(15,1)=3.32, p=0.088. There was no significant interaction between these variables, 
ANOVA F(15,1)=0.98, p=0.34. In general, subjects make more looks towards the 
speedometer when in the Speed Task, with a trend for noise to increase this number. 
 
Look durations 
Look durations on the leader and speedometer were examined for the influence of 
task and noise presence. The top of Figure 14 summarizes this data for looks to the 
leader. There was a main effect of task on the mean duration of leader looks, 2.76s vs. 
1.33s, ANOVA F(15,1)=11.52, p=0.004, but not of noise, 2.03s vs. 2.06s, ANOVA 
F(15,1)=0.04, p=0.84. However, there was a significant interaction between these 
variables, ANOVA F(15,1)=5.33, p=.035. There was no effect of speed noise in the Lead 
Task condition (2.61s) versus the Lead Task with noise condition (2.91s), t(30)=-1.37, 
p=0.19.  However, there was an effect of noise in the Speed Task condition (1.46s vs. 
1.2s), t(30)=2.14, p=.049. On average subjects decreased look durations on the leader by 
260ms in the Speed Task and noise was present. Although subjects appear to increase 
their look durations on the leader by ~300ms in the Leader Task condition with noise, the 
leader conditions have high variance and this effect is not reliable.  
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Figure 14: Mean look duration on the leader car and speedometer. 
(Top) Average duration of looks to the lead car in both tasks, with and without noise 
added. (Bottom) Average duration of looks to the speedometer in both tasks, with and 
without noise added. Error bars show +/-1 SEM. 
 
The bottom of Figure 14 summarizes duration data for the looks on the 
speedometer. There was a main effect of task on the mean duration of speedometer looks, 
0.51s vs. 0.72s, ANOVA F(15,1)=22.67, p=0.0002, and of noise, 0.57s vs. 0.66s, 
ANOVA F(15,1)=13, p=0.002. There was also significant interaction between these 
variables, ANOVA F(15,1)=5.33, p=.035. There was no effect of speed noise in the 
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Leader Task (0.5s) versus the Leader Task with noise condition (0.52s), t(30)=-.64, 
p=0.53.  However, there was an effect of noise for Speed Task condition (0.64s vs. 0.8s), 
t(30)=-3.56, p=0.003. On average subjects increased look durations at the speedometer by 
~160ms when in the Speed Task and noise was present. 
 
Interlook Interval Duration 
The duration between successive looks on an object gives a metric for polling 
frequency, i.e. if a subject looks away from an object how long does the subject wait on 
average before getting new sensory information about that same object with a new look?  
Interlook intervals were calculated for the leader or the speedometer and examined for 
effects of task and noise presence. 
The top of Figure 15 summarizes this data for interlook intervals for the leader. 
There was a main effect of task on the mean interlook interval duration of leader looks, 
0.46s vs. 0.76s, ANOVA F(15,1)=35,25, p<0.0001,  and of noise, 0.55s vs. 0.67s, 
ANOVA F(15,1)=24 p=0.0002. There was also a significant interaction between these 
variables, ANOVA F(15,1)=12, p=.003. There was no effect of noise presence in the 
Leader Task (0.44s) versus the following with noise condition (0.48s), t(30)=-1.54, 
p=0.15.  However, there was an effect of noise presence in the Speed Task (0.66s vs. 
0.86s), t(30)=-5.11, p=.0001. On average subjects increased look interlook interval 
durations on the leader by ~200ms in the Speed Task when noise was present. 
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Figure 15: Mean interlook interval durations for the leader car and speedometer. 
(Top) Average interlook interval duration for looks to the lead car in both tasks, with and 
without noise added. (Bottom) Average interlook interval duration for looks to the 
speedometer in both tasks, with and without noise added. Error bars show +/-1 SEM. 
 
The bottom of Figure 15 summarizes the interlook interval data for the 
speedometer. There was a main effect of task on the mean interlook interval duration, 
4.48s vs. 1.92s, ANOVA F(15,1)=16.57, p=0.001, but not of noise presence, 3.33s vs. 
3.07s, ANOVA F(15,1)=0.83, p=0.37. There was no significant interaction between these 
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variables, ANOVA F(15,1)=2.48, p=0.14. Although the repeated measures ANOVA 
suggests that there is no effect of noise, planned paired-sample t-tests were conducted 
similar to our above analyses. There was no effect of noise in the Leader Task (4.4s) 
versus the following with noise condition (4.6s), t(30)=-0.35, p=0.73.  However, there 
was an effect of noise for the Speed Task (2.3s vs. 1.6s), t(30)= -3.56, p=0.003. This t-
test result suggests that on average subjects decreased look interlook interval durations on 
the speedometer by 160ms when in the Speed Task and noise was present. 
 
Transition Matrices 
One way to describe the dynamics of gaze behavior is to consider transition 
probabilities between or within a given object category. One-step Markov transition 
conditional probabilities consider a single state transition from the current time step and 
one time step back and can be easily calculated from the look data by simply counting the 
proportions of look transitions between and within object categories. Table 2 presents the 
Markov transition probabilities in the set of driving conditions for all object categories.  
Such tables are difficult to analyze given the number of possible comparisons and 
interdependence of the data, however it still is useful from a qualitative perspective to 
characterize local dynamics in the selection of eye movements.  In Table 2 we see that 
the findings above concerning look proportion etc. are reflected in the transition 
probabilities from going to and from the speedometer and leader.  Similar to the above 
results, there appears to be task effect that increases the probability of transitioning to the 
speedometer from other look categories by about 10% when the speed task is 
emphasized.  The effect of noise is more complex and the effects found above are not  
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Table 2: Look Transition Probabilities. 
1-Step Markov transition probabilities (in %) for starting at an initial look object 
category and fixating a final category. SEM is presented in parentheses 
Leader&Task:
Speedometer Oncoming. Outgoing Leader Other
Speedometer 0 1#(1) 1#(1) 77#(5) 21(5)
Oncoming 0 6#(2) 11#(7) 65#(9) 19#(8)
Outgoing 2#(1) 2#(2) 12#(3) 75#(5) 8#(3)
Leader 44#(4) 5#(2) 20#(3) 6#(2) 25#(4)
Other 13#(3) 2#(1) 5#(2) 76#(4) 3#(1)
Leader+Noise&Task:
Speedometer Oncoming. Outgoing Leader Other
Speedometer 1#(1) 0 2#(1) 66#(6) 31#(6)
Oncoming 0 1#(1) 1#(1) 79#(5) 19#(5)
Outgoing 4#(2) 1#(1) 6#(2) 78#(3) 12#(3)
Leader 40#(4) 5#(1) 21#(3) 7#(1) 28#(5)
Other 23#(4) 3#(1) 7#(1) 63#(4) 5#(2)
Speed&Task:
Speedometer Oncoming. Outgoing Leader Other
Speedometer 1#(1) 0 3#(1) 74#(6) 22#(6)
Oncoming 1#(1) 1#(1) 1#(1) 84#(7) 14#(7)
Outgoing 4(1) 1#(1) 12#(2) 66#(4) 18#(4)
Leader 55#(5) 3#(1) 18#(2) 4#(1) 21#(4)
Other 18#(3) 3#(1) 18#(5) 57#(5) 4#(1)
Speed+Noise&Task:
Speedometer Oncoming. Outgoing Leader Other
Speedometer 0 0 4#(1) 65#(8) 31#(8)
Oncoming 0 12#(4) 2#(2) 75#(7) 11#(5)
Outgoing 6#(2) 2#(2) 9#(3) 70#(4) 13#(3)
Leader 56#(5) 2#(1) 19#(2) 4#(1) 18#(4)
Other 30#(4) 2#(2) 11#(2) 50#(4) 6#(1)
Table&1:###Transition#Probabilities#(in#%)#for#starting#at#an#initial#look#object#category#and#fixating#
a#final#object#category.#Standard#error#of#the#mean#presented#in#parentheses
Final&Look&Object&Category
Initital&Look&
Object&
Category
Final&Look&Object&Category
Initital&Look&
Object&
Category
Final&Look&Object&Category
Initital&Look&
Object&
Category
Final&Look&Object&Category
Initital&Look&
Object&
Category
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immediately obvious as it appears the effects are spread across types of transitions. 
 
 DISCUSSION 
 To summarize the main findings of the results from Experiment 2, overall we 
have found a consistent interaction effect between the level of reward for the Speed Task 
and the noise or uncertainty present in that task.  While the speedometer has noise in both 
the Leader Task with noise the Speed Task with noise conditions, we have demonstrated 
that gaze behavior only seems to be altered if the Speed Task has been emphasized as the 
task with high reward.  These results are consistent with our initial predictions and given 
this result we can now continue to the next chapter where we will consider several types 
of models that might explain this type of gaze scheduling and focus on how a full 
implementation of the Sprague and Ballard model can be used to simulate our driving 
conditions and make predictions concerning our experimental design. 
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8. Computational models of human gaze behavior in driving 
 
THE SCHEDULING PROBLEM 
Thus far we have shown that human gaze behavior appears to be influenced by 
both estimates of reward or task demand characteristics and uncertainty in a naturalistic 
driving task. Importantly, the main effect we observed was an interaction between reward 
and uncertainty, suggesting that eye movements are driven to reduce uncertainty only if 
the uncertainty source has high behavioral relevance or reward. What types of models of 
eye movements might capture this behavior?  In terms of the scheduling problem 
introduced in the first few chapters, this suggests that an appropriate solution would be a 
perceptual arbitration mechanism that that incorporates these variables and allocates 
visual attention based on a rational decision mechanism that can use this information, 
possibly in a manner like the Sprague and Ballard model. In this section I will introduce 
several possible models of gaze behavior, starting with some extremely simplistic 
schedulers, a saliency model, and a leaky integrator before leading up to an overview of a 
full implementation of the Sprague and Ballard model in our driving scenario. 
 
SIMPLE SCHEDULERS 
While our data suggests that human observers are incorporating reward and 
uncertainty, it is worth considering less sophisticated models to have an understanding of 
baseline simulated behavior and to understand why a more complex model may be 
necessary to capture human behavior in natural tasks.  I have implemented four types of 
simple schedulers that we will discuss in turn: Two random fixation schedulers based on 
sampling object categories from a uniform distribution, one via a probabilistic method 
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directly sampling from a uniform distribution and another using a ‘round-robin’ strategy 
of polling object categories in a predefined order.  The other two simple schedulers are 
calculated from the human data and use probability distributions, one derived from the 
global probability distributions of gaze and one from conditional probability 
distributions based on the driving scene context. 
To implement these schedulers, Monte Carlo and bootstrapping simulations were 
run using the traversals of each subject through the environment.  Using either 
distributions from subject data or predefined uniform distributions, the four simple 
schedulers were tested against one another.  The scheduling mechanisms are assumed to 
operate on an object- and task-category level.  The simulation takes a given subject’s 
traversal through the environment and considers each frame individually and the 
simulation chooses an object category for ‘fixation’ on that frame.  This fixation category 
is compared to set of onscreen content labels and marked as a fixation if that object is 
present.  If the object is not present the fixation is kept on its prior label, while the 
mechanisms are quite different, a request to look at something not present onscreen might 
be considered analogous to a peripheral search that fails to detect a desired target.  Each 
subject’s data file from Experiment 1 was analyzed in this manner and the simulated 
fixations are counted and plotted as a proportion of total summed fixations as in Figure 
16. 
Superficially, it can be seen that the uniform distribution and round-robin 
schedulers output very similar results as would be expected since they are different forms 
of sampling from the same distribution.  While they do not follow the exact pattern of the 
human data they do capture some general characteristics of shape.  Given that these are 
completely naïve schedulers, this suggests that part of the human data can be explained 
simply by the content of object categories onscreen.  While theoretically a scheduler that 
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uniformly samples all portions of a scene extremely quickly could be a potentially useful 
perceptual scheduling strategy, it appears that humans are not doing something this 
straightforward. 
If gaze distribution reflects subjects’ task priorities, a possible model of fixation 
scheduling might simply require knowledge of these priorities on a global level with a 
scheduler using the global distribution of fixations (see Figure 6).  While it is not clear 
how one would know a priori or learn this priority weighting, this approach could capture 
a great deal of human behavior. Using conditional distributions offers a finer grained 
analysis of human gaze distribution and would presumably describe even more of the 
behavior. As subjects drove through the environment the local scene context changed, 
e.g. sometimes a pedestrian and oncoming car were present and at other times absent. By 
using local screen context we should be able to even more closely describe gaze 
distributions. To build these conditional distributions we can use the output of the 
automated analysis, which provides a frame-by-frame description of onscreen content 
and build a binary descriptor label for the presence or absence for the set of object 
category labels. Conditional probability distributions for fixations in a particular scene 
context can be calculated and used in the simulations.  These conditional probabilities 
might reflect local changes in task priority that are not captured by global statistics. Using 
distributions conditioned on scene context tests the hypothesis that global probabilities do 
not take into account momentary scene changes that will affect gaze distributions and 
possible task priorities. 
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Figure 16: Fixation proportion distributions from four simple scheduler model 
simulations. 
An example of simulation output using data from the self-paced condition in Experiment 
1. Four schedulers were tested by using frame-by-frame traversals of the human data 
where a particular type of probability distribution was used to select a fixation target. 
Summed gaze durations are normalized by total summed fixation durations per subject 
trial.  Error bars represent +/- 1 SEM.   
 
As shown in Figure 16, both of these data based approaches are much closer to 
the human data than the uniform schedulers. The conditional distribution lies nearly 
perfectly on top of the human data because of its increased granularity of contextual 
information.  Figure 17 shows an analysis of how close each scheduler fits the human 
data by measuring the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the simulated distribution 
and the actual human data from Experiment 1.   
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Figure 17:  Kullback-Leibler Divergence of scheduler models with human data. 
Simulations were run over 10 epochs to calculate mean and standard deviations. of the 
KL divergence for each scheduling model.   
 
To ascertain the distance between simulated distributions and human data, the simulation 
was run using parameter from each subjects’ data. For each data file, the simulation 
would make a fixation prediction on each 60hz time step for the entire length of the data 
file (~120s). A complete run through the entire data set (9 subject’s files) was considered 
an epoch. At the end of each file the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) was calculated 
using the human fixation distribution as the true data distribution we are trying to encode 
with one of the simulations outputs.  The KLD gives a measure in bits to describe how 
much more information is needed to code a true distribution (the actual human data) with 
another candidate distribution (the scheduler predictions).  This provides an easy way to 
compare complex distributions via a single number.  Figure 17 shows the calculated KLD 
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for all of the schedulers using data from the self-paced condition, run over 10 epochs.  
This figure neatly summarizes the fact that the conditional probability scheduler performs 
best and suggests that an appropriate model of human gaze scheduling should take local 
context into account. 
 
Summary of simple scheduler models 
While the above analysis was coarse and only concerned with global fixation 
distributions, we have shown that simplistic models of gaze scheduling using uniform 
distributions do not capture human behavior well. Furthermore, simulations using global 
probabilities of human fixation data suggest that a scheduler that is biased to towards a 
task-related objects (assuming the human data implicitly reflects this) is a better predictor 
but does miss subtleties in the human data.  By using conditional fixation distributions on 
scene context, the best fit of the human data is found.  However, these results are rather 
unenlightening because it effectively says that human behavior is the best predictor for 
human behavior.  While this may be useful from a classification perspective, it does not 
give much insight into the internal process human drivers use to select gaze targets.  
However, it does suggest that humans are sensitive to scene context and candidate 
algorithms should incorporate this element.  
Another problem with the above approaches is that it is not clear how they would 
be modified to incorporate our experimental variables or reward and uncertainty.  While 
it can be claimed that using subject’s global fixation distributions reflects these reward 
priorities, this model does not explicitly represent this variable. Even more problematic is 
the representation of uncertainty, while the global and conditional models above will 
appropriately capture whatever data their distributions are based on, we are again faced 
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with no explicit representation of uncertainty and a very weak framework to extend and 
make any sort of new predictions before we have recorded the necessary human data to 
calculate these distributions from. 
 
SALIENCY MODEL 
One problem with the simple schedulers above is that they do not consider the 
image content and local context.   While most saliency models do not explicitly use task 
uncertainty or reward, it is possible that an image-based scheme may capture some of the 
dynamics in driving behavior due to the fact that salient objects might be task relevant.  
In this section, I will not perform a thorough analysis of comparing a saliency model 
against human behavior. Instead, I’ll present a single analysis from one from Experiment 
1, the mismatch between this output and the human data is sufficiently great to argue that 
a saliency model is not a useful candidate to describe gaze allocation in driving. The most 
recent version of the Itti Lab’s saliency model was downloaded (a Linux Mandriva 
virtual machine implementation available for download at: 
http://ilab.usc.edu/toolkit/downloads-virtualbox.shtml).  This was run on a single video 
from one subject’s run in the follow condition and each fixation was manually scored for 
object category.  Figure 18 presents the gaze distribution of the saliency algorithm for 
this driving trial.  It is apparent that the distribution of gaze is highly mismatched against 
the human data.  The algorithm largely sticks to non-task relevant objects in the other 
category.  Because, the algorithm uses image feature contrast it is attracted to many 
objects on the side of the road and this output suggests that a purely feature-based 
approach is unsuited to the driving data. 
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Figure 18: Example of Saliency Algorithm’s fixation distribution from a single driving 
trial 
One subject’s video from an Experiment 1 Leader Following trial was run through the 
Itti Lab’s Saliency Visual Attention Algorithm.  
 
UNCERTAINTY BASED MODELS 
Another approach to modeling gaze would be to directly represent our uncertainty 
and the actual process of information accrual in the visual system.  Senders (1983) 
presented several variants of gaze allocation models that were based on principles from 
sampling and information theory.  In his formulations, Senders considered varying 
complexities of information accrual an active sensor system might employ to schedule 
gaze. In his most simplistic version, a periodic sampler, it is suggested that if human 
observers acted as samplers of Gaussian processes operating at the Nyquist frequency, we 
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would expect gaze durations to be an entropy rate proportional to log of the rate at which 
a signal changes (RMS amplitude) over the minimum amount allowable RMS error in its 
signal. The general premise is that if multiple sensors have difference information rates 
the amount of time an observer should monitor is proportional to how much the signal 
varies and what internal threshold the observer has for estimation error and this can be 
used to calculate relative gaze proportions.  However, the signals being monitored are not 
Gaussian processes and the human drivers are in control of the signals they monitor (i.e. 
the distance to leader and car velocity) it is not clear if this approach has a rational 
mapping to our scenario.  Furthermore, it is unknown what internal threshold for RMS 
error might be for the leader task and speed following task.   
Senders did develop an uncertainty-based model for driving with periodic 
interruptions.  His general framework was that human observers actively accrue 
information over time in a linear fashion and this information decays at an exponential 
rate when information access is blocked (i.e. vision is occluded or an eye moves away 
from the information source). This can be simplistically represented as:   
[Information Stored(t)] = [Information(t-1)] + [New Information] 
 – [Outdated Information] – [Memory Loss] 
 
In Senders case, calculations were made that tried to estimate the amount of 
information available on the road with the general idea being that the higher the velocity 
the more information flux.  He assumed observers rapidly accrued information when 
vision was not interrupted. However, when vision was blocked this information leaked 
due to road knowledge being outdated and general short-term memory loss.  Senders 
showed that when subject to periodic vision blockages subjects will slow down to 
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balance the rate of information uptake and loss proportional to the length and duration of 
the period of vision blackout.   
We can draw an analogy between Senders blackout period with the time when a 
subject foveates the speedometer or the leader. It is assumed that when information for 
one object is accessed with a fixation, this effectively means the other objects are 
‘blacked out’ and subject to information loss.  Although Senders did not state his 
algorithm as such, it effectively functions as a leaky integrator. A leaky integrator is a 
mathematical representation of a capacitor in electronics, which has rate parameters for 
the speed of charging the capacitor, dependent on an input signal, and for outflow when 
the system is allowed to discharge.  Given our results in Experiment 2, we can 
hypothesize that the short duration of speedometer looks and large interfixation interval 
mean the information accrual for the Speed Task has a relatively rapid charging rate and 
a slow decay. Similarly, given the longer durations of leader looks and higher 
interfixation rate, Leader Task information is accrued at a slow rate and discharged 
rapidly. It is possible to setup a system with two leaky integrators (treated as one for the 
Speed Task and one for the Leader Task) with the rate parameters described above and to 
allow them to ‘vote’ for access to an input signal and allowed to charge, if the integrator 
loses the vote it is switched into discharge mode. The voting process is achieved by 
normalizing the activity across integrators and using a probability proportional to: (1-
Charge).  This results in an integrator being more likely to be allowed access to the input  
signal if it has little charge, which I treat as analogous to the situation of have little 
information regarding that signal.   
It is also possible to implement a statistical estimator as a leaky integrator, 
maintaining running average estimates from a set of input signal sources.  As in the leaky 
integrator, each source is input into an estimator that has rate parameters for 
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accumulation and discharge.  However, instead of an integration process we instead 
calculating a mean and standard deviation on each step.  Following the properties of 
normal distributions one can estimate the standard error of the mean, which decreases as 
a function of the number of samples available. When a high variance input signal is 
measured, initially its SEM estimate will be high but will rapidly decay with more 
samples.  One can treat the estimates of the SEMs for the two scenarios as a measure of 
confidence; if the SEM is low then we assume we have a high amount of information 
concerning the signal.  If we must select between which source has access to new 
information, the estimator that is not updated loses samples on each time step and its 
SEM accordingly grows.  By using the ratio of SEM estimates, one can probabilistically 
select a signal source to receive a fixation, similar to the approach for the standard leaky 
integrator above.   Figure 19 shows an example of the output from the leaky statistical 
estimator. 
From a set of primary analyses, Sender’s algorithm and the leaky statistical 
integrators do capture some of the dynamics of information accrual and decay but they 
are difficult to fit to the driving data. In both of these approaches, there are several rate 
constants that need to be experimentally motivated or estimated via an optimization 
process.  In addition, Sender’s model also needs an entropic description of the input 
signal and requires additional constants that help fit a subject’s data. In our scenario, it 
became difficult to find sets of rate parameters and input variances with non-linear 
optimization could not reliably reproduce the observed fixation distributions.  In general, 
these approaches tend to generate fixations of near fixed length (although the 
probabilistic aspect of fixation selection can help vary this) and do not represent the 
diversity found in human look duration histograms. These approaches also do not 
explicitly represent reward and it is not clear how this should be added to such models.  
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Figure 19: Example output from a leaky statistical estimator simulation. 
(Top). The probability of a module making a fixation. (Middle) The running estimate of 
the SEM for each module. (Bottom).  Each rectangular block represents a portion of time 
spent fixating either the Leader module (blue) or Speedometer (red). For ease of 
visualization this run only selects the module with the greatest probability and does not 
perform a weighted die roll as described in the text. 
 
While this approach has the benefit of trying to model the process of information 
acquisition it is not easy to map onto our experiments. Sender’s had the opportunity to 
observe subjects rate of speed versus the amount of visual block out and could fit his 
models to this slope.  However, we do not have access to this information concerning our 
driving paradigm and at best can merely say that although this style of model provides a 
more realistic description of the underlying process of information acquisition in human 
drivers than the prior models discussed, they can be difficult to set up and the lack of an 
explicit representation of reward makes them difficult to map onto the results from 
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Experiment 2. Now we will now move on discussing the application of the Sprague and 
Ballard model to the driving experiments. 
 
APPLYING THE SPRAGUE & BALLARD MODEL TO HUMAN GAZE BEHAVIOR IN DRIVING 
From the prior models discussed, it becomes apparent that while most have some 
merit they are rather difficult to map onto our experimental variables of reward and 
uncertainty.  The Sprague and Ballard model does explicitly represent these variables, 
however, it is also quite complex and I’ll discuss the implementation in parts. First, we 
must consider the control system and it’s representation of reward. Given this reward 
representation, we must consider how well this represents human behavior and the 
possibilities for fitting the reward model to human behavior.  Lastly, once this reward 
based control framework has been established, we can discuss the perceptual arbitration 
algorithm and how it can be used to model the data from Experiment 2. Over the course 
of developing our implementation of the Sprague and Ballard model, there were many 
design decisions that had to made and a variety of versions that have been tested.  I will 
not exhaustively list these attempts, but instead provide an overview of its development 
history and finish with our most recent results. 
 
Modular RL for Driving 
Our driving simulation consists of C cars that drive in two lanes of a simulated 
world all driving in the same direction. Prior implementations attempted the introduction 
of oncoming traffic and pedestrians but these proved difficult and as we progressed we  
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Figure 20: Representation of Driving Agent’s world 
(Left) The simulated RL driving world consists of the LA (black dot), a pace   car that the 
LA is rewarded for following (blue dot), and several other agents that the LA is punished 
for hitting (red dots). Each car has a ``flag'' whose length indicates the car's speed. 
Lanes for driving are shown as curvy colored lines, even though to the RL agents the 
lanes are one-dimensional. (Right) The state space of the RL simulation can be projected 
easily into a 3D virtual reality driving simulation in the lab. Human subjects see this sort 
of view of the driving environment as they drive around in the virtual world. 
 
limited our experimental scope to only explain following another car, following a 
constant speed, and avoidance of other cars.  Two of the cars in the world have special 
roles: Car 1 is controlled by the learning agent in the simulation and Car 2 is called the 
``leader car'' and is described in more detail below. Cars 3…C serve mostly as obstacles 
for the learning agent (LA). Figure 20 (left) shows a screenshot of the cars in the 
simulated world, and Figure 20 (right) shows a screenshot of state space in the simulated 
world, after we have projected it into the realistic 3D driving environment that we use for 
human subjects. All of the cars move in the same direction and are constrained to drive 
along one of two tracks that represent the two available lanes on the road. Each car thus 
maintains three scalar variables that describe its state in the world: δc represents the 
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distance (in meters) traveled along the track by car C, σc represents the speed (in meters 
per second) of the car on its track, and λc is a binary tuple {0, 1} representing the lane 
(left or right) that car c currently occupies. In the 3D simulation for humans, these scalars 
are mapped to the 3D positions of the lanes in a virtual world that also includes buildings, 
signs, and other realistic effects, but each car in the RL portion of the simulation is 
completely represented by these three scalars. 
All cars other than the learner car move at a fixed speed along one track, but these 
states change randomly on average every N time steps (typically 30-100) to prevent the 
LA from overlearning a static world and allowing a more comprehensive search of the 
state space. When choosing new values, cars 2…C draw a new location in the 
environment (roughly uniform spacing from each other), a new speed uniformly from     
[Σ-ε, Σ+ε]; where Σ is the goal speed (17m/s in our simulations) for the LA, and ε is a 
small value usually 1-5, and they finally draw a new lane uniformly from {0, 1}. This 
allows a setup similar to Experiment 2 where cars are mostly driving at a similar speed 
and distributed across the environment at different distances and in different lanes. 
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Figure 21: A graphical depiction of the state spaces used by the driving modules. 
The LA is represented in gray. Each driving module requires one or more pieces of 
unique information. The forward progress module has access to the LA’s velocity. The 
following module accesses the distance to the other car and its lane position and the LA’s 
velocity, relative velocity may also be included.  The avoidance module uses the same 
information but for non-leader cars.  
 
Task Modules 
The RL model uses several modules coordinated over time to drive. While there 
are many possible sub-tasks to include in our framework we limited ourselves to a basic 
set that could be applied to data from human drivers. These modules are dedicated to 
tasks for avoidance, following another car, and simply driving forward at set speed.  
Figure 21 shows a graphical representation of the state space used by each module 
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discussed below. Additionally, refer back to Figure 1 for a high level overview of the 
scheduling model and how modules are coordinated (note in the current implementation 
pedestrian avoidance is omitted).  
	  
Forward	  Progress 
The LA is encouraged to move around the track by a dedicated task module that 
provides a small positive reward RΣ with a γ of ~0.2 whenever the LA is moving at Σ, the 
speed set point. Without this task module, the LA tends to stop moving, which no humans 
do in the 3D driving simulator. The state space for this task is simply the speed of the LA, 
divided into Nσ uniformly spaced bins, usually steps of 1m/s. 
 
Car	  Following	  
The LA receives a positive reward Rf with a γ of ~.95-.99 for following the pace 
car at a fixed distance, with a relative speed of 0 m/s (i.e., whenever the LA is following 
behind the pace car and both cars are going the same speed). The state space for this 
module consists of three dimensions: the lane indicator, the relative distance, and speed 
of the LA. In some simulations relative speed was used instead of LA velocity. The lane 
indicator is an ordered pair from {0, 1} times {0, 1} that represents the lanes for the LA 
and the pace car. The relative distance is given by: (δ2-δ1)-D, where D represents the 
desired following distance (set to 15-20m in our simulations). This dimension is 
quantized into Nδ uniformly spaced bins, typically of a size between 1-5m. Similarly, the 
relative speed is given by: σ2-σ1, and is quantized into uniformly spaced bins, typically 
sized between 0.5-1 m/s. Note that we tried many variations of state 
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Car	  Avoidance	  
The LA receives a negative reward Rc with a γ of ~0.7 for colliding with any of 
the other cars in the world. A world state is considered a collision whenever:  
and the relative speed between the LA and the obstacle is less than 0. This task uses the 
same state space as the following task described above. The driving simulation includes 
one task module that tracks the closest obstacle (not including the pace car) to the LA at 
every time step. 
 
Action	  Space	  
While each module tracks different pieces of information in the world, they share 
the same set of actions. Given the current state of the world, the LA can read out the Q 
estimates for each module and evaluate the optimal action via GM-SARSA. The action 
space for each module contains a steering component and a velocity component, except 
the forward progress module, which only outputs a velocity command. The actions are 
discretized such that steering control has three options: staying in the same lane, changing 
to the right lane, or changing to the left lane. Similarly, velocity control features three 
options: speed up (+v), stay at the same speed (0), or slow down (-v), with v taking on a 
value usually of 1 m/s. 
 
Training	  and	  Evaluation	  
Training takes place in episodes that start with a randomly configured world and 
ends whenever a collision occurs or a sensor reading is at its max, e.g. the lead car is at 
the maximum distance in the state space. This reset helps to ensure the LA visits a large 
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amount of the state space and does not over train in areas far from reward states.  Note, 
during training the LA has perfect perceptual access and has no uncertainty in its state 
space readings. When an episode ends, the LA undergoes 100 time steps of evaluation to 
track the progress of training, and then the world is reconfigured randomly and a new 
training episode begins. To reset the world, all cars 2…C are placed by randomly 
selecting a lane, position, and speed across the full ranges of these variables. The LA is 
placed behind the pace car near D+ε, where ε is a random uniform number from [-D, D], 
again this randomization allow variety in the state space search. 
 Figures 22 and 23 provide examples of learned Q-tables and following 
performance respectively.  After training the agent for 1000 to 2000 trials, the system 
converges on structured Q-tables and provides adequate performance for following. In 
general, following another car or a speed was relatively easy to learn. However, 
avoidance proved problematic and ultimately we chose not to pursue further development 
of this module and instead pared down our simulation to use only two modules: one for 
following a speed and one for following another car. In general it often proved difficult to 
reliably get adequate performance from the RL learner. The RL framework has a 
multitude of variables and one is presented with many choices such as how does one 
randomly initialize the state space, what gamma values to use, how to discretize the state 
space, and what state dimensions should be used. Because of the difficulty in getting 
reasonable performance with a complicated model, we chose to keep our RL model as 
simple as possible. This limits what we can say about our experiment to only the 
experimentally manipulated variables concerning task-based reward and uncertainty. 
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Figure 22: Example of a learned Q-table for following. 
(Top) The surface shows the Q-table values (discounted expected reward) for a single 
action in the leader module. Distance is relative such that zero, where the reward peak 
lies, is at the desired following set point. (Bottom) A policy map created by assigning an 
arrow (i.e. speed up, slow down) for the action associated with the maximum Q-value for 
a state. 
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Figure 23: Example of following performance with a trained RL agent.  
The green line represents the agent’s distance to the leader. The blue line represents the 
trained set point.  The agent was trained over a 1000 trials and then allowed to follow a 
lead car and have its performance recorded. 
  
APPLYING THE RL MODEL TO HUMAN DATA  
Given that we have a RL framework, there is a problem that arises due to the fact 
that we have chosen reward values for the modules through a trial and error process until 
appropriate behavior was found. The perceptual arbitration algorithm relies on 
appropriate reward estimates to function and ideally we would like to have an estimate of 
human drivers’ relative reward priorities across modules.  One approach to estimate 
human drivers’ module reward weightings is to use inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) 
(Rothkopf and Ballard, In Preparation, Rothkopf 2008, Ramachandran and Amir 2007). 
Rothkopf and Ballard’s variant of IRL finds the maximum likelihood reward weight 
parameters for a modular RL system to describe a set of training data from human actors. 
Once the RL agent has been trained, the learned Q-tables can be normalized to  
+/-1 and we introduce wm, a tuple that holds a weight from 0 to 1 for the mth module and 
we assume that Σwm=1.  We then take the human data and proceed to discretize the 
human data using the same state space present in our RL learner.  In this case we used the 
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human subjects’ car velocity for the speed following module and used the subject’s car 
velocity and distance to leader for the following module.  Relative velocity to leader can 
also be used but was not found to affect the outcome of IRL.  Each subjects’ runs through 
the environment was taken and discretized into this state space at 250ms intervals, results 
in ~400 observations from an average 100s drive. 
Before testing the IRL algorithm on human data, extensive testing was done on 
the IRL algorithm to test it’s performance on a test data set where we had prior 
knowledge of the true Q-tables used and the ability to sample from the policy for many 
more observations than would be available from the human data. First a set of m Q-tables 
were randomly generated from a uniform distribution {-1, 1} using a state size equal to 
the modules state space size in the RL learner.  These tables were then weighted by a 
randomly selected set of weights. Given these weighted tables, one can read out a policy 
by selecting a given state across modules and using softmax to generate an observed 
action.  These simulations afford the possibility to systematically control the amount 
observations presented to the IRL algorithm with full knowledge of the true module 
weightings used to generate the set of observations. 
Figure 24 shows the performance of the IRL algorithm on sets of randomly 
generated Q-tables.  The IRL algorithm exponentially improves performance as the 
amount of observations increase and levels off at ~0.05 error.  It is worth noting that our 
human data set is quite small compared to our test set.  Most subjects generate ~400 
observations, thus setting a limit on how well we might expect the IRL algorithm to 
perform on a single human trial of ~0.1 RMSE. Given these results with the test data set, 
we proceeded to test the IRL algorithm on the data generated from Experiment 2. 
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Figure 24: Example of IRL performance with randomly generated Q-tables.  
The IRL algorithm was run many times with varying numbers of total observations.  The 
vertical axis represents RMSE error between the estimated weights and the true weights 
used to generate the set of observations. The dashed red line represent the SEM, 
generated by running the IRL algorithm 50 times for each level of observations. 
 
Figure 25 shows a plot of the average estimated weights from the IRL algorithm 
on the data set from Experiment 2.  It immediately becomes clear that the IRL algorithm  
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Figure 25: Example of mean IRL performance on human data from Experiment 2.  
The IRL algorithm was run on each trial from all subjects from Experiment 2 and 
averaged across each experimental condition. The vertical axis represents the module 
weight on the speed following module and the horizontal represents the same for the 
Following module. SEMs are not shown but are ~0.2-0.3 for each condition. 
 
finds weights that do not sensibly match up with the experimental conditions.  For 
example, the follow the leader condition is estimated as having the highest weight on the 
speed following module, whereas the follow speed with noise condition has the lowest 
weight for the speed module.  Given this discrepancy, many attempts were made to 
understand why this occurred.   
First, it could be the case that these estimates are correct but the framework we 
have chosen poorly models the human state space.  Given that our test data set worked 
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well it could be the case that we are merely witnessing problems due to a small set of 
observations. Additionally, a core assumption of the modules framework and IRL 
algorithm is that the modules are independent.  Unfortunately, in our experiment the 
actions performed tended to be correlated. The lead car drove very close to the 40mph 
velocity subjects were also instructed to follow.  If the driver was too far from the leader, 
they would often also be going too slow and in both cases they would need to speed up. 
These types of correlations would make it difficult for the IRL inference process to 
disambiguate which module is most responsible if they often agree on the action to be 
taken.  
Another problem may be that the Q-tables learned in our simulations are not good 
matches to what human drivers use.   To test this idea, we tried using handcrafted Q-
tables that were idealized smoothed out versions of what our RL agent should learned but 
found no improvement. We also tried using the human data to form Q-table estimates. 
Given that we have the human data in discretized form, we can count the number of times 
an action was executed in given a particular state and calculate a probability distribution 
for the probability of an action given a state, PSubject(a|s).  This technique failed to give 
better results and in principle should be a poor proxy for a Q-table without strong 
independence assumptions. We can observe the human drivers’ actions and states but do 
not have access to their individual task modules. Thus, attempts to calculate a proxy Q-
table directly from the human data will fail, as the actions selected will result from a 
composite table across tasks and won’t reveal individual Q-tables for each module. 
To summarize, although several attempts were made to fit the human data via IRL 
it became apparent that this approach did not give experimentally plausible results. 
Although this removes our capacity to directly model the human data per subject, we still 
have the capacity to run the perceptual arbitration algorithm using reward weightings that 
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are at least conceptually in line with what our experimental manipulation was and to 
observe what type of behavior the scheduling algorithm exhibits in more ideal 
circumstances. 
 
PERCEPTUAL ARBITRATION 
To test the perceptual arbitration algorithm, a trained agent with only modules for 
following a leader and a speed was allowed to run in a set of simulations where reward 
and uncertainty were systematically varied in a systematic fashion similar to Experiment 
2.  Initially the LA was trained for 1500 trials and then had its Q-tables normalized to  
+/-1 and saved.  These Q-tables were then used for subsequent tests of the perceptual 
arbitration algorithm.   
From our experimental data, it was assumed that although subjects are instructed 
to emphasized one task over the other, in general the leader task was always the most 
time consuming.  Given the structure of our task, this assumption is somewhat tenuous as 
subjects may look at the leader for other reasons besides getting information about the 
leader, e.g. it could provide a convenient central location for peripheral monitoring. 
Additionally, it may be that the visual computation used to control distance to the lead car 
is inherently more time consuming due to an integration process.  However, since our 
simulation assumes (wrongly) that all computations are effectively instantaneous the only 
way to mimic this aspect is to make the following module have a high reward. In our 
simulations we assumed that in conditions where leader following was emphasized, 
reward weightings were: wLeader=0.95 and wspeed=0.05.   In conditions where speed 
following was emphasized, reward weightings were: wLeader=0.85 and wspeed=0.15.    
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The other parameter that needs to be set in the perceptual arbitration algorithm is 
the observation covariance matrix for the Kalman filter.  When the Kalman filter goes 
offline the algorithms estimates are propagated through time and their uncertainty growth 
is proportional to the magnitude of these covariance matrices.  In our driving simulations, 
we do not have good knowledge of human observers’ estimates on the difference in 
variance between conditions with and without velocity noise.  When holding the gas 
pedal constant there is a small fluctuation in car speed due to electronics noise that varies 
velocity by a rather small amount ~0.05m/s, when in the noise present conditions the 
maximum swing in velocity is ~10m/s.  This means that there is roughly one to two 
orders of magnitude difference in range between these conditions.  However, in the 
simulations these levels of uncertainty did not have a dramatic effect.  In order to obtain 
results that were similar to the humans in the noise absent conditions the covariance 
matrices were weighted by clead=0.01 cspeed=0.01. In the noise absent conditions the 
covariance matrices were weighted by clead=0.01 cspeed=1000. Obviously, these parameters 
a quite different from what we would expect from the human data.   
It is worth mentioning at this point that although the Kalman filter is an optimal 
statistical estimator for Gaussian processes it is not know if human subjects use a process 
similar to this.  The Kalman filter is primarily an engineering tool and assumes one 
knows the observation and system covariances a priori.  It is possible that humans use a 
process similar to the leaky statistical estimator that was presented where they are 
maintaining a direct estimate of mean and variance from online statistics, something that 
the Kalman filter does not exploit, although there are adaptive Kalman filters that 
incorporate online statistics.  It is also worth repeating that the state space we have 
chosen for our actions and rewards is not directly mapped to the state-space 
representation human drivers actually use. As such, it is not surprising that the parameters 
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needed to make uncertainty grow rapidly in our model may be quite different from my 
approximation of uncertainty estimates with and without velocity noise for human 
drivers.  That being said, further research is needed to study how uncertainty growth 
interacts with reward weightings in the perceptual arbitration model so that we can 
understand the source of this discrepancy. 
With these caveats, Figure 26 shows the result of running the perceptual 
arbitration algorithm on 100 trials, where on each trial the agent was allowed to move 
100 time steps.  The requests by the perceptual arbitration algorithm for module updates 
were recorded and the proportion of updates was calculated.  The simulations results are 
ordinally similar to the results from Experiment 2. We see that when noise is present and 
reward is high, the speedometer module is updated most frequently and it is updated the 
least when uncertainty and reward are low. In this simulation, it was found that the agent 
made a similar amount of update requests for the speed module in the Follow Task with 
noise condition and in the Speed Task condition.  Although this is similar to our initial 
predictions for Experiment 2, the human data did not bear this out (see Figure 12).  It 
appears that human drivers may have a stronger weighting of reward regardless of the 
uncertainty level present. The perceptual arbitration algorithm is sensitive to its reward 
and uncertainty parameters and it may be the case that human observers are using a 
similar but different algorithm with a nonlinearity present. For instance, there may be a 
minimum amount of reward associated with a task that needs to be present before a 
human observer will actively seek to reduce uncertainty about that signal. Given that the 
perceptual arbitration algorithm was originally devised as a rational decision making 
algorithm without an effort to directly model human gaze behavior, this finding suggests 
that there may be some refinement required to improve its predictions.  
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Figure 26: Example of perceptual arbitration performance using parameters similar to the 
conditions in Experiment 2 
The horizontal axis represents the proportion of time the speed following module was 
updated. Using q-tables from a trained RL learner the perceptual arbitration algorithm 
was allowed to run for 100 trials with each trial a length of 100 time steps.  Q-tables and 
uncertainty growth rates were set to mimic the conditions of Experiment 2. Error bars 
indicate +/-1 SEM. 
 
In the final chapter, I’ll address the advantages and disadvantages of these 
modeling attempts. Overall, we have yet to find any single algorithm that quantitatively 
predicts human behavior in our driving task.  However, it is promising is that the 
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scheduling model was able to ordinally predict some of human behavior in the driving 
simulation.  This suggests that while our particular implementation may need further 
refinement, a modeling framework that directly represents reward and uncertainty in the 
context of a visuo-motor control loop is worth further research. 
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9. Dissertation Summary and Discussion 
SUMMARY 
The goal of this dissertation research has been to gain insight into how humans 
use eye movements to actively gather information from a dynamic world.  In particular, I 
have argued and provided evidence for the fact the human visual system uses 
representations of reward and uncertainty in a rational manner to deploy gaze over time.  
Additionally, I presented a set of computational models that attempt to capture this 
behavior. 
While reward and uncertainty have been topics of recent research in human 
behavioral studies, ours is unique in that we had participants engage in the complex task 
of driving and we were able to show that eye movements are allocated in a way that 
shows sensitivity to reward and uncertainty.  While there have been other demonstrations 
of comparable reward-based effects in complex environments (Rothkopf et al, 2007; 
Jovancevic and Hayhoe, 2009), there has been no previous demonstration of the role of 
uncertainty in regulating gaze in the natural world.  Our primary result showed that when 
confronted with a signal with perceptual uncertainty, eye movements are only made to 
reduce uncertainty if this signal is associated with a task that has a sufficient amount of 
reward.  Furthermore, I implemented and discussed several approaches to modeling this 
behavior that fail to capture this behavior.  These attempts setup my final computational 
modeling approach using the Sprague and Ballard modeling framework. This model is 
distinctive amongst other current models of visual attention in that it explicitly models 
the visual perception and action loop with the premise that an agent or organism in a 
dynamic world needs to allocate visual attention in rational way that actively reduces 
uncertainty based upon reward driven task priorities. Due to the complexity of our 
driving environment, I was unable to exactly model our driving experiment with enough 
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fidelity to make exact predictions concerning eye movement dynamics.  However, it was 
shown that such a model could generate similar behavior to the human drivers, with 
reasonable approximations to our experimental parameters. Given these results I’ll now 
address future avenues for experimental improvements and new experiments as well as 
the same for computational models of vision.  
 
FUTURE WORK 
The process of setting up and testing an experimental environment using virtual 
reality was quite lengthy, involving several technology switches and extensive piloting 
before leading to the experiments presented here.  With this experimental setup 
established, it will allow more time to focus on a variety of new experiments. There are 
several areas where future experiments could improve our manipulations as well as 
explore more detailed hypotheses about human gaze behavior in light of our findings 
with the various models of visual attention.   
 
Reward & Uncertainty 
Our experiments relied on implicit manipulations of task related reward and while 
we obtained large task effects, more systematic variation of reward would have several 
benefits. In our attempts to map a reinforcement-learning framework onto driving, the 
shape and scale of what a human’s Q-table might be was not known. Instead we had to 
rely on the assumption that if humans can control a car in lawful manner we should be 
able to replicate that with a RL control system.  This isn’t a bad assumption, but opens up 
many possible ways to model human behavior, since one needs to find a suitable 
controller for each task, but this may or may not match humans’ true control strategy.   
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Additionally, while RL offers a convenient mathematical representation for 
reward, other controllers could be used as long as they incorporate some cost function 
that can be mapped onto human behavior.  For example, Anderson & Sauer (2007) built a 
controller to model following behavior in driving. They found that a PID-style controller 
fit human driver data reasonably well, but also had to be tuned properly to do so. One key 
insight from their work was that human control tends to have over and undershoot 
portions.  Since our controllers were designed without an attempt to directly model 
human behavior, but instead an idealized form of a set of driving tasks, we may have 
introduced mismatches into our controller that do not appropriately represent what human 
drivers do.   
Future studies will need to more thoroughly test validity of the individual control 
modules with respect to human behavior. It is worth mentioning that our control models 
lacked an underlying physics model. In the driving simulator, the car has a transmission 
and inertia, and a variety of lags and transformations occur between the foot being 
pressed on the pedal and car motion occurring.  Our approach may need to be modified to 
incorporate a more realistic description of the driving interface.  Alternatively, we could 
simplify the physics model in the driving environment to more closely match our model’s 
basic physics assumptions. In sum, these issues all may have contributed to using a 
controller that nominally works in its simulated environment, but is in actuality a poor 
descriptor of human behavior. 
In our experiment we sought to manipulate implicit rewards in the environment 
because it is a more ecologically valid approach.  Unfortunately, we found that attempts 
to infer these reward weightings via IRL did not produce expected results. This may be 
due to a lack of data for the inference process to succeed, as well as possible breaks with 
the assumption that the Speed Task and Leader Task were truly independent. If the above 
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recommendations for improving modules do not correct the problems we have observed, 
it may be necessary to use explicit rewards, e.g. points or money. This may help ground 
subject’s expectations for performance as well as help in modeling the reward structure. 
While our goal is to understanding natural vision in a lab setting, these types of 
experiments can make systematic manipulations difficult.  If one wishes to thoroughly 
explore human gaze allocation with varying levels of uncertainty and reward, it may be 
necessary to first try these ideas in more simple psychophysical paradigms before scaling 
to natural tasks (e.g. see Navalpakam, Koch, Rangel, and Perona 2010).  For example, in 
our pilot studies there were numerous attempts to manipulate reward by changing 
instruction and uncertainty by changing the noise characteristics in velocity. In early pilot 
studies, there appeared to be no effect of noise on drivers’ eye movements.  Driving is 
sufficiently complicated and time consuming that introducing a noise source becomes 
quite tricky and piloting simple experiments with parametric variations could ease this 
transition.  
The notion of task modules relies on the assumption that humans can 
compartmentalize tasks that require unique perceptual information and they can run 
independently and concurrently.  Our research cannot say much in regard to the 
biological plausibility of modules. While they may be a useful construct for describing 
human behavior, it is not known what the nature of their neural representation is.  
Additionally, in retrospect we should have been more careful in selecting experimental 
variables, as the Following condition and the Speed condition appear to overlap in ways 
that made inference of humans reward priorities impossible. However, there are ways to 
address this experimentally: An experiment could be designed where participants are 
instructed to perform only one task and rewards within this task could be manipulated. 
Human choice behavior in this setup would give more direct insight into what type of 
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module representation is appropriate and ease the problem of implementing a modular 
controller.  Each task module could be tested independently and then as a group. Modules 
are assumed to sum linearly in reward space according to a set of task defined priority 
weightings but this has not been tested.  Rothkopf (2008) did try this type of 
manipulation in his study of human walking but his work did not attempt to explain 
human gaze behavior via modules.  Independent testing of modules derived from human 
subjects would also provide evidence on how well a modular approach explains human 
behavior and be more in line with the work of Anderson & Sauer, instead of using 
idealized controllers as in our current model. Theoretically, modules are a computational 
boon because they help simplify state space representation and speed up search. 
However, in principle a composite RL learner without modules or some other control 
methodology without modules would have the same behavior if all of the learning 
algorithms were allowed to converge. A composite representation disrupts the original 
formulation of the perceptual arbitration algorithm but one could modify it such that a 
selection process for sensory updating occurs not at a module level but at a feature-level 
(i.e. along a particular dimension in the state space). For instance, many of the modules 
we built required velocity information. On a module level it easy to keep pieces of 
information separate, however it is not known how humans incorporate redundant 
information across tasks, it’s seems possible that in some cases modules may have a 
shared representation for features in common.  
Concerning uncertainty manipulations, the arguments above also hold true.  Using 
independent tests of task-modules under different levels of uncertainty and then 
combined as a whole would offer a more detailed understanding of how human observers 
incorporate this factor than the current experiments.  Senders captured data with 
parametric variations in uncertainty in his driving ‘black-out’ experiments and found a 
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systematic relationship between uncertainty and the ability of a driver to keep a car at a 
given velocity.  This type of approach, although not always easy experimentally, would 
be helpful in illuminating subtleties in behavior beyond the simple assertion that human 
eye movements can be shown to adapt to uncertainty.  Additionally, there is enormous 
variety in what I have lumped into a generic category of uncertainty. A number of 
features in our experiments could be manipulated, e.g. reducing contrast by adding fog, 
rain, or a nighttime situation, making other cars erratic instead of the subject’s.  
Additionally, the statistics of such uncertainty distributions could be rigorously 
categorized instead of merely using one particular type of noise as in our experiments. 
 
Perceptual Arbitration 
In it useful to bear in mind that Sprague and Ballard’s perceptual arbitration 
algorithm was devised as a rational approach to reduce uncertainty within a reward based 
framework.  It was not modeled directly on human behavior, nor has it been shown to be 
an optimal solution for this type of problem.  In our experiments, we noted that the 
human drivers in the Follow Task did not make any extra looks on the speedometer when 
noise was present compared to when it was absent.  However, in our simulations the 
model did make more speed module updates.  This mismatch between behavior and 
theory needs to be more fully explored. It may be the case that humans have a threshold 
or other non-linearity present in how likely they are to reduce uncertainty.  The nature of 
the interaction we found needs to be further explored by using the types of experimental 
variations I discussed above.  This would help to guide future modeling attempts to more 
accurately reproduce human behavior. 
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CONCLUSION 
The study of vision in natural tasks is important, but also difficult. As experiments 
become more complex to reflect what the visual system must accomplish in the real 
world, the number of possible variables to manipulate becomes quite large.  What 
variables are relevant and scientifically interesting are not always easy to assess a priori. 
While on the surface the research presented here is about how humans drive, our goal in 
understanding sensory systems is more ambitious. It is effectively a theory of tasks and a 
description the active polling of task-related information in the world with sensory 
systems. What I mean by the statement ‘a theory of tasks,’ is that once we assume that 
the orienting and active information collection of sensory systems are driven by a 
combination of bottom-up and top-down controller mechanisms, the ultimate goal would 
be to build an adaptive system, that when given a set of sensors and some means of 
interacting with the world, would be able to optimally deploy its sensory apparatus to 
achieve a set of behavioral goals (be they inherent drives like we see in all animals, 
learned in some manner, or perhaps given as instructions for human designed goals such 
as surveillance or mapping an area).  
This effectively becomes a robotics problem and within that field it has become 
apparent that building such a flexible system is extremely difficult if not inherently 
misguided.  Evolution has spawned a huge variety of creatures with all types of sensory 
systems and means of locomotion, all specialized for biological niches that have taken 
eons to develop.  It is tempting to speculate that certain operations for brain function may 
be so necessary that there may be some underlying unifying approach that is in fact 
highly advantageous if not optimal.  While this may be true, and in fact it has been show 
in some cases that human and animal behavior can be close to optimal, it is very difficult 
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to ascertain how to develop such a theory when there an infinite number of tasks that one 
might desire to present to such a system.   
Ultimately, this becomes a question of pragmatics. We cannot perform all 
possible experiments, so we need to choose wisely.  For instance, I have said very little 
concerning what role uncertainty and reward may have in real world driving.  If we desire 
to know how to improve driver safety, then it behooves us to examine the types of 
uncertainty that are common in the real world, such as rain and poor lighting. If we wish 
to explore the theoretical possibilities of all sorts of non-naturalistic noise or sets of 
reward and task contingencies that can be introduced, this too can be done but may have 
little relevance to natural vision and may be bereft of any positive impact on society. That 
being said, it can be useful to know what types of information humans are sensitive to 
and if their behavior is adaptive or maladaptive, even in situations that may be rooted in a 
lab setting.  
Coming back to the Sprague and Ballard scheduling framework, it is worth 
keeping these thoughts in mind, as it requires an experimenter to design a set of 
perception and action modules and this can be rather difficult to approach. In some 
settings like driving, some of these task-modules may be obvious. However, what 
modules one should select for something like going shopping or observing a piece of 
artwork would be very difficult to ascertain and may bring into question the 
appropriateness of such a framework.  
From prior research we know that a realistic model of human vision will need a 
bottom-up component and it will also need a way to dynamically select these features for 
any number of goals. My research has shown that it would also need to have some way to 
track how relevant and rewarding some task-related features are and also have the ability 
to gauge their uncertainty. Additionally, there will need to be some method of arbitrating 
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between task goals, be it via modules or some other framework. Of course, then we must 
also ask how are task relevant features learned and how are the tasks themselves learned 
in the first place?  
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